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Self-learning algorithms are gradually dominating more and more 
aspects of our lives. They do so by performing tasks and reaching 
decisions that were once reserved exclusively for human beings. And 
not only that—in certain contexts, their decision-making performance 
is shown to be superior to that of humans. However, as superior as 
they may be, self-learning algorithms (also referred to as artificial 
intelligence (AI) systems, “smart robots,” or “autonomous machines”) 
can still cause damage.
When determining the liability of a human tortfeasor causing 
damage, the applicable legal framework is generally that of 
negligence. To be found negligent, the tortfeasor must have acted in a 
manner not compliant with the standard of “the reasonable person.” 
Given the growing similarity of self-learning algorithms to humans in 
the nature of decisions they make and the type of damages they may 
cause (for example, a human driver and a driverless vehicle causing 
similar car accidents), several scholars have proposed the 
development of a “reasonable algorithm” standard, to be applied to 
self-learning systems.
To date, however, academia has not attempted to address the 
practical question of how such a standard might be applied to 
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algorithms, and what the content of analysis ought to be in order to 
achieve the goals behind tort law of promoting safety and victims’ 
compensation on the one hand, and achieving the right balance 
between these goals and encouraging the development of beneficial 
technologies on the other.
This Article analyzes the “reasonableness” standard used in tort 
law in the context of the unique qualities, weaknesses, and strengths 
that algorithms possess comparatively to human actors and also 
examines whether the reasonableness standard is at all compatible 
with self-learning algorithms. Concluding that it generally is, the 
Article’s main contribution is its proposal of a concrete “reasonable 
algorithm” standard that could be practically applied by decision-
makers. This standard accounts for the differences between human and 
algorithmic decision-making. The “reasonable algorithm” standard 
also allows the application of the reasonableness standard to 
algorithms in a manner that promotes the aims of tort law while 
avoiding a dampening effect on the development and usage of new, 
beneficial technologies.
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Introduction
The clock has struck midnight, and the tired physician on call at the
hospital sees a patient suffering from meningitis. Having asked the patient 
whether she has any allergies and receiving a negative answer, the physician 
immediately administers penicillin-based antibiotics. Unfortunately, scrib-
bled in the long medical record the patient brought with her was a note that 
she was indeed allergic to penicillin. If the patient then suffers significant 
physical damage as a result of the decision to administer penicillin-based 
antibiotics, is the physician legally liable for the resulting damage?
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Damages caused by human tortfeasors are judged under the well-
established framework of negligence. Under the negligence analysis, a 
wrongdoer is liable for damages if all four elements of establishing negli-
gence exist.
1
One of these elements is the “breach of a duty of care,” which 
is determined by scrutinizing whether a “reasonable person” would have 
made comparable decisions under similar circumstances. In cases dealing 
with professional negligence, such as medical malpractice, “reasonableness” 
is evaluated in comparison to the decisions expected from a reasonable pro-
fessional in the same field, rather than from an ordinary person.
2
The reasonableness analysis is advantageous in part because it allows 
courts to promote desired goals and social behaviors in a flexible manner.
3
In general, the two main aims of tort law are to compensate victims for 
harm suffered and to encourage potential wrongdoers to minimize risks.
4
At 
the same time, these rationales must be balanced with considerations of effi-
ciency and the potential chilling effect a tort framework may have on the 
development and usage of socially-desirable practices or technologies.
5
In 
our meningitis example, modern tort analysis considers the desire to en-
courage physicians to be more careful in their work and granting the patient 
compensation for the injury she suffered, both of which favor holding the 
physician liable for administrating antibiotics without thoroughly reviewing 
the patient’s medical record. But tort analysis would also be reluctant to 
cause inefficiency in the healthcare system by requiring physicians to read 
1. These consist of a duty of care by the wrongdoer to the injured; a breach of that 
duty; damage sustained by the injured; and a causal link between the breach of the duty and 
the damage suffered. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (AM. L. INST. 1965); W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164–65 (5th ed. 1984).
2. For example, in the hypothetical presented above, the physician’s decision to pre-
scribe penicillin-based antibiotics despite the patient’s allergy records would be evaluated in 
comparison to the decisions expected of reasonable physicians in her same field. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“Unless he represents that 
he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice 
of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by 
members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities.”); Michael A. 
Froomkin et al., When AIs Outperform Doctors: Confronting the Challenges of a Tort-
Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 33, 54–58 (2019).
3. See infra Section I.B.ii for further discussion.
4. See infra notes 29–34 and accompanying text.
5. See Alberto Galasso & Hong Luo, Tort Reform and Innovation, 60 J.L. & ECON.
385, 386 (2017); Jennifer L. Phillips, Information Liability: The Possible Chilling Effect of 
Tort Claims Against Producers of Geographic Information Systems Data, 26 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 743 (1999) (considering chilling effects on producers of GIS data); David A. Anderson, 
First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 755 (2004) (describing general 
hesitation to enforce tort law where such enforcement would chill free speech); Laurel Witt, 
Preventing the Rogue Bot Journalist: Protection from Non-Human Defamation, 15 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 517, 532 (2017) (“Congress intended Section 230 [of the Communications Decen-
cy Act] to prevent a chilling effect for platforms that could otherwise be liable for third-party 
information.”).
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every detail of lengthy medical records, and it would additionally be con-
cerned with creating an undesirable discouraging effect on the physician
profession due to fear of legal exposure.
6
The reasonableness analysis al-
lows courts to strike tailor-made balances between these considerations, 
based on the current circumstances and objectives they wish to promote.
7
The potential benefits and dangers of some newly emerging technolo-
gies warrant a very careful balance between the aforementioned considera-
tions.
8
One particularly important question for torts is whether the reasona-
bleness analysis ought to apply when the tortfeasor is not a person, but 
rather a “self-learning,” “autonomous,” or “artificially intelligent” system.
9
This Article will refer to such systems as “thinking algorithms” because 
their algorithms model various stages of human thinking and do so inde-
pendently of a human.
10
6. Jeffrey O’Connell & Andrew S. Boutros, Treating Medical Malpractice Claims 
Under a Variant of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 373, 396–97
(2002) (“It is often asserted that fear of liability has also caused many physicians . . . to leave 
high-risk geographic areas, to abandon their particular area of medical practice in exchange 
for less litigious fields of medicine, or to even retire early. Moreover, fear of liability may also 
have an impact on the rate of students willing to matriculate in medical schools.”).
7. If our meningitis example were to occur during a crisis in the healthcare system, for 
example, courts may determine that it was reasonable of the physician not to look at the pa-
tient’s medical record. They could also fine-tune said conclusion based on relevant parameters 
such as the number of other patients who were awaiting treatment, on the urgency of the pa-
tient’s medical condition, or on the length of the medical record that was ignored. If, on the 
other hand, physicians’ attention was not a scarce resource, then the court would likely set 
higher standards of reasonableness, favoring risk-avoidance and compensating the victim con-
siderations over ones of efficiency and avoiding a chilling effect (thus, potentially, holding 
that physicians must always read the entire medical record regardless of the circumstances, or 
setting more strict standards of when it is reasonable not to do so in the case of overcrowded 
healthcare systems).
8. See generally T. W. Small et al., Designing an Accessible, Technology-Driven Jus-
tice System: An Exercise in Testing the Access to Justice Technology Bill of Rights, 79 WASH.
L. REV. 223, 250 (2004) (theorizing that designing a new system of laws would include at-
tempts to optimize benefits and minimize risks of technology); Steven D. Seybold, Some-
body’s Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies, 93 TEX. L. REV.
1029, 1059 (2015) (discussing the importance of maintaining a proper balance as technology 
“continue[s] to evolve and present new dangers to the rights of citizens”); Shlomit Yanisky-
Ravid & Sean K. Hallisey, “Equality and Privacy by Design”: A New Model of Artificial In-
telligence Data Transparency via Auditing, Certification, and Safe Harbor Regimes, 46 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 428, 474–75 (2019) (discussing the need for “balanc[ing] the need for AI 
innovation against the dangers of discrimination”).
9. The “buzzwords” used to describe the type of systems we view as “smart” have
various definitions and may have different embodiments. This paper is generally indifferent to 
the existence (or lack thereof) of any physical embodiment of the “smart” system. See, in that 
context, Professor Jack Balkin’s suggestion that both algorithms and robots are similar mem-
bers of the “Algorithmic Society” and might be treated alike. Jack M. Balkin, 2016 Sidley 
Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and Policy: The Three Laws of Robotics in the
Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1226 (2017).
10. For a discussion of the difference between algorithmic and human decision-making, 
see infra Part II.
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Technology is ever advancing, and thinking algorithms’ self-learning 
abilities allow them to reach conclusions based on databases of previous 
cases.
11
This in turn enables humans to entrust machines to make complex 
decisions that until recently required human discretion, and even to replace 
professional human judgment in matters of expertise where there is no clear 
right or wrong answer. In the field of medicine, physicians increasingly rely 
on algorithms to diagnose medical conditions and select optimal treat-
ments.
12
In the field of law, virtual attorneys are utilized by law firms to 
conduct legal research,
13
algorithmic online dispute resolution mechanisms 
solve disputes online,
14
and bail algorithms determine whether defendants 
awaiting trial may post bail to be released.
15
In everyday life, human drivers 
in various countries now share the road with autonomous vehicles,
16
while 
algorithms are used interchangeably with human professionals to provide 
tax advice, serve as company directors, and even offer religious services.
17
Assume then that our physician prescribing penicillin is no longer a 
flesh-and-blood practitioner but is instead a sophisticated medical thinking 
11. For further discussion on how “self-learning” works, see infra Part II.
12. See, e.g., Vinod Khosla, Technology Will Replace 80% of What Doctors Do,
FORTUNE (Dec. 4, 2012, 2:26 PM), http://fortune.com/2012/12/04/technology-will-replace-
80-of-what-doctors-do; Alina Shrourou, Deep Learning in Healthcare: A Move Towards Al-
gorithmic Doctors, NEWS MED. (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.news-medical.net/news
/20170315/Deep-learning-in-healthcare-a-move-towards-algorithmic-doctors.aspx.
13. See, e.g., John Mannes, ROSS Intelligence Lands $8.7M Series A to Speed up Legal 
Research with AI, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 11, 2017, 2:34 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/10
/11/ross-intelligence-lands-8-7m-series-a-to-speed-up-legal-research-with-ai; Anthony Sills, 
ROSS and Watson Tackle the Law, IBM: WATSON BLOG (Jan. 14, 2016), 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/watson/2016/01/ross-and-watson-tackle-the-law.
14. Michael Legg, The Future of Dispute Resolution: Online ADR and Online Courts,
27 AUSTRALASIAN DISP. RESOL. J. 227 (2016).
15. A.J. Wang, Procedural Justice and Risk-Assessment Algorithms 1 (June 21, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=3170136); cf. Tom Simonite, How to Up-
grade Judges with Machine Learning, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603763/how-to-upgrade-judges-with-machine-learning 
(discussing how algorithms may assist judges to predict which defendants will fail to show to 
court).
16. For the current state of autonomous vehicle development and deployment, see, e.g., 
Sean Bollman, Autonomous Vehicles: A Future Fast Approaching with No One Behind the 
Wheel, 20 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 1–4 (2020); Laura J. Grabouski, On the Road: Driver-
less Cars Are Disrupting Norms and Legal Standards, 82 TEX. BAR J. 232 (2019); Adam 
Kaslikowsi, Everything You Need to Know About Autonomous Vehicles, DIGIT. TRENDS (June 
30, 2019), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cars/the-current-state-of-autonomous-vehicles.
17. Richard Susskind & Daniel Susskind, Technology Will Replace Many Doctors, 
Lawyers, and Other Professionals, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 11, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10
/robots-will-replace-doctors-lawyers-and-other-professionals; Sasha A.Q. Scott, Algorithmic 
Absolution: The Case of Catholic Confessional Apps, 11 ONLINE - HEIDELBERG J. RELIGIONS 
ON INTERNET 254 (2016). For a forecast on the percentage of actions currently performed by 
human professionals that could be replaced by automation, see Automation Potential and 
Wages for US Jobs, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://public.tableau.com/profile
/mckinsey.analytics#!/vizhome/AutomationandUSjobs/Technicalpotentialforautomation.
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algorithm. Should the reasonableness analysis be applied to the medical 
thinking algorithm, just as it would be in the case of a human doctor? Alt-
hough case law has left the question largely unaddressed,
18
academia has to 
some extent discussed the general concept of applying a reasonableness 
standard to algorithms and robots. Setting the obvious concern of who 
would pay for any damages caused by algorithms aside,
19
academics have 
pointed to several advantages of subjecting algorithms to the reasonableness 
analysis. Law and health professor Ryan Abbott, for example, has argued 
that holding computerized tortfeasors to a negligence standard would accel-
erate the adoption of safer technology and thus result in fewer accidents.
20
I
have previously argued that applying a reasonableness standard to algo-
rithms would result in more equality among victims by minimizing anoma-
lies that would otherwise occur under a scheme where human and algorith-
mic tortfeasors who caused identical harm were subject to completely 
different tort frameworks.
21
Additionally, the growing improvement of algorithmic performance vis-
à-vis humans could lead to a reality in which the general standard of care 
sufficient to avoid liability would no longer be that expected of a person. 
Rather, an elevated level of care—one that represents the generally higher 
level of care that algorithms can provide—might become the prevailing 
18. A very similar question might have been addressed in the case of Nilsson v. Gen-
eral Motors LLC, where a motorcyclist hit by an autonomous vehicle alleged that the vehicle 
itself drove in a negligent manner. The case, brought before the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California, was settled before trial, leaving the question of algorithmic 
negligence, and thus of algorithmic reasonableness, undiscussed. Complaint for Damages, 
Nilsson v. General Motors LLC, No. 4:18-cv-00471-KAW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2018).
19. Rather, applying a reasonableness analysis would be a way of determining liability, 
which would then be undertaken by a legal or natural person, similar to how employees’ rea-
sonableness is evaluated in tort cases where employers are sued, even though it is the employ-
er who would pay damages if the worker was negligent. For further discussion, see infra Part 
III.
20. Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort Liabil-
ity, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 22 (2018).
21. Karni Chagal-Feferkorn, The Reasonable Algorithm, 1 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y
111, 116–17 (2018).
The concept of algorithmic reasonableness was also discussed by David Vladeck who re-
ferred to an elevated standard of care to be required of autonomous vehicles, by Jeffrey Gur-
ney who suggested imputing a “reasonableness” standard to driverless vehicles, and by Justice 
Curtis E.A. Karnow who referred to the “reasonableness” of the actions of a robot as a means 
of dealing with the fact that its actions are unexpected and not fully pre-programmed by its 
manufacturers. David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial 
Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, (2014); Jeffrey K. Gurney, Imputing Driverhood: Apply-
ing a Reasonable Driver Standard to Accidents Caused by Autonomous Vehicles, in ROBOT 
ETHICS 2.0: FROM AUTONOMOUS CARS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 51 (Patrick Lin et al. 
eds., 2017); Curtis E.A. Karnow, The Application of Traditional Tort Theory to Embodied 
Machine Intelligence, in ROBOT LAW 51 (Ryan Calo et al. ed., 2016); Curtis E.A. Karnow, 
The Opinion of Machines, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 137 (2017); see also Stephanie 
Pywell, The Reasonable Robot, 7700 NEW L.J. 19 (2016).
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standard for both humans and algorithms.
22
Under such a scenario, deter-
mining whether an algorithmic standard of care has been met, such a stand-
ard must first be developed.
In that context and given the Sisyphean quest for the appropriate legal
framework to be applied to damages caused by thinking algorithms,
23
a rea-
sonableness analysis is clearly an option worth considering. However, two 
crucial questions have not yet been addressed: whether the reasonableness 
standard is compatible with the unique traits of thinking algorithms, and, if 
yes, what would analysis of algorithmic reasonableness look like? Other 
than a general, perhaps somewhat intuitive, notion that the standard of care 
expected from a thinking algorithm would be elevated compared to that re-
quired of a person,
24
existing literature has not yet delved into the practical 
question of how to assess whether an algorithm acted reasonably or not. As 
one scholar notes, “[w]e have a generally workable view of what it means 
for a person to act negligently or otherwise act in a legally culpable manner, 
22. Froomkin et al., supra note 2, at 50, 60–61 (“once ML diagnostics are statistically 
superior to humans, it will only be a short while before legal systems, including in the United 
States, treat machine diagnosis as the ‘standard of care.’ . . . Thus, a physician, hospital, or 
insurer relying on an ML diagnosis will, at least initially, be held to no higher standard than 
that of the ordinary physician. Once ML itself becomes the standard of care, ML will raise the 
bar.”); see also Abbott, supra note 20; Gurney, supra note 21 (“[G]iven that autonomous ve-
hicles do not suffer from human frailties, and given that these vehicles will supposedly have 
the ability to detect objects better than humans, one would expect that (eventually) autono-
mous vehicles will be held to a higher standard than human drivers.”)
23. “Precisely how revolutionary robot-driven accidents will be for our legal system is 
less clear . . . although opinions vary, a tentative consensus has emerged on at least one front. 
For most, conventional tort liability theories are essentially nonstarters.” Bryan Casey, Robot 
Ipsa Loquitur, 108 GEO. L.J. 225, 230 (2019); see also Marta Infantino & Weiwei Wang, Al-
gorithmic Torts: A Prospective Comparative Overview, 28 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 309, 313–14 (2019) (stating that “[o]ne does not need a crystal ball to predict that, as 
algorithm-related activities multiply around us, so will accidents . . . [that] will cause people 
to suffer some kind of loss,” and noting that tort law must develop to determine remedies to 
such loss); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83 (2017) (“The rise of 
increasingly complex algorithms calls for critical thought about how best to prevent, deter, 
and compensate for the harms that they cause.”); Alexander B. Lemann, Autonomous Vehi-
cles, Technological Progress, and the Scope Problem in Products Liability, 12 J. TORT L. 157 
(2019) (“How the legal system should attribute responsibility for the (hopefully few) crashes
autonomous vehicles cause is an open and hotly debated question.”).
24. See Vladeck, supra note 21, at 131 (The court in Arnold v. Reuther ruled that a 
driver was not liable for hitting a pedestrian because he was only human and not a robot: “A
human being, no matter how efficient, is not a mechanical robot and does not possess the abil-
ity of a radar machine to discover danger before it becomes manifest. Some allowances, how-
ever slight, must be made for human frailties and for reaction, and if any allowance whatever 
is made for the fact that a human being must require a fraction of a second for reaction and 
cannot respond with the mechanical speed and accuracy such as is found in modern mechani-
cal devices, it must be realized that there was nothing that Reuther, a human being, could have 
done to have avoided the unfortunate result . . . .”).
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but we have no similarly well-defined conception of what it means for an 
algorithm to do so.”
25
What specific criteria ought to shape the “reasonable algorithm” analy-
sis? The factors we use must allow the assessment itself to be practical 
while simultaneously both fulfilling tort law’s goals of promoting safety and 
compensating the injured party and balancing the need to avoid a chilling 
effect on the development and usage of innovative technologies. Developing 
a reasonableness standard suited to thinking algorithms is therefore no easy 
task.
From a practical perspective, reasonableness is a reference point, meas-
ured against other alternative courses of action or decisions that could have 
been reached. When we assess the reasonableness of humans, we look to 
how similar persons or professionals might have behaved in similar situa-
tions, and this assessment is often aided by expert testimony.
26
In the case of 
thinking algorithms, however, there is no cohort of equivalent systems with 
which to compare. Experts cannot necessarily opine on what a different al-
gorithm might have done because there is often no sufficient volume of oth-
er examples to point to. And we cannot solve this practical challenge by as-
sessing the reasonableness of algorithms based on how humans would have 
acted, as doing so would preserve a static standard and would ignore the 
tremendous scope of technology to continuously improve and achieve better 
and safer results than those of humans.
Alternatively, we may presume prima facie that algorithms are abso-
lutely superior to their human counterparts and set the bar at some elevated 
point beyond that of human reasonableness.
27
However, doing so would still 
be using human competence as a baseline, resulting in demanding too little
of the algorithms whose capabilities in certain fields might be beyond hu-
man abilities or comprehension. At the same time, such a solution might al-
so pose the threat of demanding too much of the algorithm, as it assumes 
their general superiority over humans, ignoring the fact that, even when al-
gorithms deliver better results than humans on average, their decision-
25. Tutt, supra note 23, at 105; see also Andrew D. Selbst, Negligence and AI’s Human 
Users, 100 B.U. L. Rev. 1315, 1318 (2020) (“With most new technologies, we gain familiari-
ty over time, eventually creating a sense of what constitutes reasonable care or a collective 
intuition on which negligence law can rely as it adapts. AI poses challenges for negligence 
law that may delay the common law’s ability to adapt or even prevent adaptation outright.”).
26. Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 
370 (2012). Said approach for assessing reasonableness is the positive one. For a discussion 
differentiating between the positive and normative approaches for determining reasonable-
ness, see infra notes 35–46 and accompanying text.
27. For instance, by granting a safe harbour to systems whose general performance is 
better than that of humans. See Mark M. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, 86 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1384 (2019). For further discussion of said proposal, see infra notes 161–
62 and accompanying text.
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making process is still characterized by certain weaknesses compared to that 
of a person.
28
This Article analyzes aspects in which the reasonableness assessment is 
compatible with the unique qualities of thinking algorithms and examines 
which of their traits require creative adjustments of the analysis. The Arti-
cle’s main contribution lies in proposing a concrete “reasonable algorithm” 
standard that could be practically applied by decision-makers. This is done 
in a manner that accounts for the differences between humans and algo-
rithms, and applies the reasonableness standard to algorithms in a way that 
promotes safety and victims’ compensation while avoiding a dampening ef-
fect on the development and usage of new, beneficial technologies.
Part I reviews the concept of “the reasonable person” to provide contex-
tual background to my proposed model of determining algorithmic reasona-
bleness, while Part II focuses on thinking algorithms and analyzes how their 
decision-making process is different (for better or worse) from that of hu-
mans. Part III discusses the concept of applying a reasonableness standard 
to thinking algorithms, including its advantages and challenges, and Part IV 
proposes a concrete model for analyzing an algorithm’s reasonableness in a 
manner that overcomes the challenges previously discussed.
Part I: The Reasonable Person
A. Rationales, History, and Manner of Assessment
Imposing legal liability on the wrongdoer for damages she caused ad-
vances two core goals. First, payment of damages by the wrongdoer assures 
that the injured party is compensated so that the wrong is theoretically “cor-
rected,” and principles of justice and fairness are met.
29
Second, imposing 
liability also serves as a deterrent—it encourages behavior modifications to 
increase overall safety. Potential tortfeasors faced with the risk of being 
found liable for damages will, the tort framework assumes, be incentivized 
to take measures to minimize the risk of causing damage.
30
Torts that do not 
require the demonstration of fault on the part of the tortfeasor might be con-
sidered superior in meeting these aims, such as product liability torts that 
impose liability only upon the existence of a defect, regardless of any 
wrongdoing by the manufacturer.
31
28. See infra Part II.
29. See generally ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).
30. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513
(2003).
31. Such is the case of defects found in the manufacturing of a product, which expose 
(under the laws of most states) the manufactures and sellers to strict liability, which does not 
require proof of any negligence. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
§ 2(a) (AM. L. INST. 1998) (“A product . . . contains a manufacturing defect when the product 
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Under the negligence theory, however, the fulfillment of tort law’s 
goals is more limited, as liability depends on the “unreasonableness” of the 
tortfeasor. To establish negligence, the following four elements must be 
proven: a duty of care exists; there has been a breach of that duty, either by 
an overt act or omission; the non-breaching party has suffered damage; and 
there is a causal link between the breach of the duty and the damage suf-
fered.
32
The reasonableness analysis comes into play when evaluating the 
breach element. A person breaches her duty of care if she does not adhere to 
the standard of reasonable care when carrying out actions that might fore-
seeably harm others.
33
“Reasonableness,” therefore, limits the cases in 
which the injured party is entitled to compensation, and also limits the ex-
tent to which potential wrongdoers must take measures to protect against 
damage. This standard can prevent over-deterrence, and within the context 
of development and usage of innovative means, utilizing the appropriate 
reasonableness standard may result in encouraging technological improve-
ments.
34
The precise balance between satisfying the objectives of tort law 
and avoiding a dampening effect on innovation heavily depends on the term 
“reasonableness” and how it is interpreted. Who is the “reasonable person” 
that serves as a reference point against which the behavior of wrongdoers is 
measured?
Since its origin, “the reasonable person” has been a vague term, open to 
various interpretations and methods of assessment.
35
Tracing back to the 
eighteenth century, English criminal liability cases used the standard of a 
“person of an ordinary capacity” to determine defendants’ liability in fraud 
cases. If a person of ordinary capacity would not have been defrauded under 
similar circumstances, then the plaintiff was considered a “fool” rather than 
a victim of a criminal act of fraud.
36
According to scholar William Hawkins,
when “common prudence and caution” were sufficient to protect one from 
being tricked or defrauded, the underlying false pretense would not be crim-
departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation 
and marketing of the product”); JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE 
OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 284–88 (2010).
32. See supra note 1.
33. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 55 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1249–50 (2009).
34. For a discussion on the balance between encouraging technological advancements 
and assuring their safety, see infra notes 58–72 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 36–50 and accompanying text.
36. One of the early decisions adopting the “person of ordinary capacity” standard was 
R. v. Jones, where the court refused to convict the defendant who presented himself as a col-
lector of debt owed by plaintiff and disappeared after collecting the money. The court held 
that “the deceit would be criminal only if it were ‘such a Cheat as a Person of an ordinary Ca-
pacity can’t discover.’” Simon Stern, R v Jones (1703), in LANDMARK CASES IN CRIMINAL 
LAW 59, 60 (Ian Williams et al. eds., 2016).
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inally punishable.37 The use of “common” and “ordinary” found its way into 
American jurisprudence as well, where a standard of “ordinary caution” was 
adopted in criminal and civil cases.38F
38
Subsequent decisions used the stand-
ard of a person of “ordinary fitness” until 1856, when an English court in-
troduced the familiar standard of reasonableness, holding that negligence is 
an act or omission from which the “prudent and reasonable” man would re-
frain.39F
39
These origins of reasonableness seem to point to a normative approach: 
one that seeks to shape the behavior of members of society using legal 
means. In the context of criminal fraud and other historic cases, courts 
sought to encourage the public to take everyday measures such as using 
common sense against fraud. Later, this normative approach—which fo-
cused on economic efficiency and deterrence—was further developed by 
Judge Learned Hand and his famous “Hand Formula” for determining 
whether a breach has occurred. Under the Hand Formula, meeting the 
standard of care requires the adoption of relevant precautions, so long as the 
cost of doing so is not higher than the expected value of the gain in safety.
40
Therefore, under a normative economic efficiency analysis, reasonableness 
is determined based on the relative cost of safety measures and the expected 
improvement of safety achieved as a result.
41
To return to the example of a
physician administrating penicillin without reading the patient’s medical 
record, a court applying the Hand Formula would compare the cost of me-
37. 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN: OR A SYSTEM
OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER THEIR PROPER 
HEADS 188 (Eliz. Nutt 1716).
38. People v. Conger, for example, held that if a person of ordinary caution would not 
be deceived, then the argued act of deception is not a criminal act. The ruling also clarified 
that the assessment of ordinary caution may differ from case to case and “may depend on a 
thousand circumstances to be considered on trial.” Stern, supra note 36, at 73.
39. Blyth v. Co. of Proprietors of the Birmingham Waterworks (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 
1047, 1049.
40. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Stephen G. 
Gilles, United States v. Carroll Towing Co.: The Hand Formula’s Home Port, in TORTS 
STORIES 11 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
41. The Hand Formula provides that when the damage expectancy (the probability of 
an accident or a damaging act multiplied by the gravity of damage) is higher than the cost of 
the safety measures required to prevent or minimise the damage, then the tortfeasor was not 
reasonable. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173. Another primary normative consideration 
discussed in the context of the reasonable person is that of Kantian morals, focusing on the 
balance between one’s freedom to act versus one’s freedom not to be constrained by another’s
(damaging) choice. Under a Kantian perspective of reasonableness, imposing liability on a 
person only to deter others from similar conduct, for instance from not taking cost-effective 
precautionary measures, is ethically problematic, as it would be treating a person as a means 
rather than as an end in itself. Miller & Perry, supra note 26, at 328. While it is interesting to 
discuss this concern in the context of robots and algorithms (presumably, treating them as 
means would not raise Kantian resistance), in its normative considerations this paper focuses 
on those concerns associated with deterrence and economic efficiency.
Spring 2021] How Can I Tell If My Algorithm Was Reasonable? 225
ticulously reading the patient’s medical record (likely translated into the 
precious time invested by the physician in said task rather than in examining 
other patients) with the likelihood of missing an important factor mentioned 
in the record, multiplied by the resulting damage such a scenario would en-
tail. For instance, if the court quantifies the cost in additional time required 
by the physician to read the medical record in detail at $1,000, the likeli-
hood of missing important information at 1%, and the potential resulting 
damage at $50,000, then the physician’s decision to treat the patient without 
thoroughly reading her medical record first would be deemed reasonable 
under the Hand Formula (since $1,000 is greater than $500). As further ex-
plained later in this Part, courts often factor in additional considerations 
when quantifying both the cost of precautions and expected damages, which 
allows for greater flexibility in shaping desired behaviors by potential 
wrongdoers.
An alternative method for assessing the reasonableness of persons is the 
positive approach. Unlike the normative approach, which is designed to
promote certain interests or values, the positive approach is more qualitative 
and assesses the behavior of the wrongdoer in comparison to how others, 
similarly situated, would have acted. In the past, such comparison to what 
the “reasonable person” would have done relied on a hypothetical “average 
man,” whose attributes were conceived based on statistical empirical obser-
vations. Measurable variables including height, weight, and propensity for 
criminal behavior were taken into account to create a model of the “average 
man,” whose theoretical behavior would constitute the reference point for 
reasonableness.
42
Pragmatically, positive reasonableness may have been 
based on a less statistical and more open-ended set of perceptions about the 
common nature of the public, based on the rationale that “if we know the 
individuals in society, we know the reasonable person.”
43
In practice, courts use both normative and positive assessments of rea-
sonableness when determining the tort liability of human beings. In medical 
malpractice cases, for example, courts tend to focus on positive assessments 
of what other physicians in a given field would have done.
44
However, they 
are not always satisfied with only evaluating whether the wrongdoer acted 
as others would have. Courts also have discretion to weigh normative eco-
nomic-efficiency considerations in negligence cases,
45
and in some instances 
42. Miller & Perry, supra note 26, at 370–71; STEPHEN M. STIGLER, THE HISTORY OF 
STATISTICS: THE MEASUREMENT OF UNCERTAINTY BEFORE 1900 201 (1986).
43. Miller & Perry, supra note 26, at 377.
44. For many years, the prevailing test for physicians’ reasonableness has been whether 
they followed medical custom. Froomkin et al., supra note 2, at 51. As discussed below, 
though, in recent years several states have adopted a different approach.
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 3 (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise rea-
sonable care under all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether 
226 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 27:213
have determined acts to be unreasonable even after acknowledging that 
comparable persons would have taken the same actions.
46
Another dimension of the reasonableness analysis is that it accounts for 
subjectivity. The key question here is to what extent should a court take the
individual attributes into consideration when determining whether the
wrongdoer acted reasonably or not. Allowing a fully subjective standard of
reasonableness would be meaningless; holding that a physician was not neg-
ligent only because, subjectively, she was tired or confused when making a
damaging decision would not leave any room for assessing reasonableness
on the basis of the underlying facts and circumstances. On the other hand, a
fully objective standard would ignore crucial information in the case, such
as physical constraints of the wrongdoer.
47
In practice, reasonableness is assessed primarily objectively, allowing
some subjectivity regarding the specific situation and state of knowledge the
individual tortfeasor possessed at the time.
48
In some instances, however, the 
courts do develop individualized groups of wrongdoers whose reasonable-
ness is then compared to the other members of the group, rather than to the 
general reasonable person. Children, for example, are not held to the rea-
sonableness standards expected of adults but rather to those of other chil-
dren,
49
and laypersons are not expected to employ the same level of care of 
professionals.
50
The assessment of the reasonable person in the tort context is therefore 
an open-ended exercise that allows courts to weigh a variety of considera-
tions on a case-by-case basis in order to determine whether a wrongdoer’s 
act or omission was reasonable.
the person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s
conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the bur-
den of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”)
46. See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (where the court disregard-
ed the standards of the ophthalmology profession which required no glaucoma tests, given its 
very low cost); see also Froomkin et al., supra note 2, at 47, 55–58 (describing a trend of 
abandoning the deference to medical custom in the case of physicians and holding physicians 
to a “reasonable physician” standard of care similar to the one applied in the case of other 
wrongdoers, in other words one that weighs normative considerations in addition to whether 
current medical practices have been followed).
47. For a proposal of applying subjective, personalised negligence law, see Omri Ben-
Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627 (2016). See also
Victoria Nourse, After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity Objectivity Ques-
tion, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 33, 33–50 (2008).
48. Miller & Perry, supra note 26, at 378–79.
49. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 293 (2001).
50. See Hous. Auth. of Carrollton v. Ayers, 88 S.E.2d 368, 372 (Ga. 1955) (“The law 
imposes upon persons performing architectural, engineering, and other professional and 
skilled services the obligation to exercise a reasonable degree of care, skill, and ability, which 
generally is taken and considered to be such a degree of care and skill as, under similar condi-
tions and like surrounding circumstances, is ordinarily employed by their respective profes-
sions.”).
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B. The Application of the Reasonableness Assessment through the 
Eyes of the Court
From a judicial point of view, the use of a reasonableness analysis to 
determine liability has different advantages and disadvantages compared to 
other legal methods for deciding tort cases (manifested both in the proce-
dural and material aspects of the judicial process). This Part will briefly re-
view certain aspects of the reasonableness analysis that are most relevant to 
the subsequent discussion in Part III of how reasonableness is affected when 
the tortfeasor is algorithmic and their effect on the legal procedure and out-
come.
i. Allowance for Flexibility in Promoting Desired Goals
Reasonableness is a broad and vague standard rather than a concrete
rule.
51
As a result, courts evaluating reasonableness have the flexibility to 
decide which interests and social goals to promote, even when these goals 
are sometimes contradictory. In the meningitis hypothetical, a court that is 
concerned about a shortage of physicians in the healthcare system could de-
cide to emphasize efficiency considerations over safety ones. As a result, 
that court may determine that a physician’s choice to rely on the information 
collected while taking the patient’s history, instead of spending time review-
ing the medical record in detail, was reasonable. By contrast, if there were 
no shortage of doctors in the healthcare system, a court might instead hold 
the opposite. The reasonableness standard allows for different rulings given 
different situations and concerns—not making a blanket statement that phy-
sicians are either always or never obliged to read medical records. Rather, a 
court may amplify or downplay certain considerations by shifting the exact 
balance point where reasonableness is set. For example, it could take into 
account the length of the medical record or the number of other patients 
awaiting the physician’s attention and tweak the specific parameters it uses 
to establish reasonable physician behavior. A court may determine that ig-
noring the medical record is reasonable if the record is more than five pages 
long, or it may decide this behavior is only permissible if the record is over 
one hundred pages. It could also rule that ignoring the record is only 
deemed reasonable if a certain ratio between the length of the document and 
the number of patients awaiting treatment is exceeded, or impose liability 
based on the level of medical urgency of the case at hand. Each determina-
tion balances both the need to improve patient safety and the need for effi-
ciency, albeit the exact balance of criteria differs in each case.
In the absence of a well-defined classification of which behavior is rea-
sonable and which is not, potential wrongdoers may also constantly fine-
51. Miller & Perry, supra note 26, at 325 (“The reasonable person is a legal concept 
that can be imbued with different content.”).
228 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 27:213
tune their behavior and generally act in ways that take into account the vari-
ous goals that courts are known to promote. Thus, even if operating under 
circumstances that have not yet been adjudicated, potential wrongdoers can 
have a general sense of what would likely be deemed reasonable and what 
would not.
As we shall see in Part III.B discussing the algorithmic context, the 
flexibility of the reasonableness analysis presents both advantages and chal-
lenges. On the positive side, flexibility by the courts to change the relative 
weights given to competing considerations such as safety promotion and 
avoiding a chilling effect on technology might be especially important when 
new, quickly evolving technologies are concerned. On the more problematic 
side is the fact that, unlike humans, thinking algorithms will likely find it 
almost impossible to fine-tune their behavior based on the broad and ever-
changing concept of reasonableness expected of them.
52
ii. Adaptable to the Dynamic Nature of Wrongdoers
Both normative and positive approaches to assessing reasonableness 
may be applied as is, regardless of the type of tortfeasor or the decision-
making tools at their disposal. A normative analysis of reasonableness is 
based on damage-prevention utility calculations or on other considerations 
the court wishes to promote. Any classifications pertaining to the tortfeasor 
(such as education level, gender, political opinion, artistic taste, or zodiac 
sign) would generally not affect the normative analysis of reasonableness. 
Rather, the court would apply a relatively objective standard and would 
make its reasonableness assessment based on the social goals it wishes to 
promote. Granted, in some special and well-defined instances, the court 
would take into account the fact that the tortfeasor belongs to a certain 
group. In the case of children and professionals, for example, the reasona-
bleness assessment is based on what is expected of the reasonableness of 
peers, rather than the general notion of the reasonable person.53
None of this, however, changes the basic concept of the normative as-
sessment. Whether the court decides to compare the wrongdoer to their own 
distinct group or to the general reasonable person, the mechanism of balanc-
ing between competing social goals (be it economic efficiency considera-
tions or others) could be equally applied regardless of the identity of the 
tortfeasor. If we take our meningitis example, then the fact that the wrong-
doer is a physician, rather than an administrator in charge of reviewing med-
ical records, might affect the normative calculus but not the normative 
mechanism itself. Presumably, the cost of reading patients’ lengthy medical 
records is higher in the case of the doctor, whose time at the hospital is like-
52. See infra notes 154–55 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
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ly much more costly than that of non-medical personnel. The differences in 
wrongdoers may therefore lead to opposite outcomes of reasonableness. If, 
for example, the damage expectancy of not reading the medical record is 
calculated at $200 and the value of time required by an administrative staff 
member to read the medical file is quantified at $150, then ignoring the file 
would be deemed unreasonable of the administrative staff member. If the 
wrongdoer is a physician whose time reading the file is valued at $500, on 
the other hand, the calculation would result in a finding of reasonableness. 
The outcome of the normative analysis may, of course, be dependent on the 
type of wrongdoer or the skills and abilities they possess. The essence of the 
normative analysis—whether conducting a Hand Formula analysis or apply-
ing other balances between desired social goals—is indifferent to the identi-
ty of players to which the assessment is applied. The same equation would 
be used both in the case of the physician and in the case of the administra-
tive staff member, but only the numerical values would be changed.
The same is true for a positive analysis of reasonableness. A positive 
analysis would take into account the exact type of wrongdoer who caused 
damage. In the field of medicine, where positive analyses are common,
54
the 
reasonableness of physicians would be determined based on the standard of 
care adhered to by other physicians.55 However, the basis for making the 
analysis—of using similarly situated wrongdoers as reference points—
would be indifferent to the nature and type of the wrongdoer. In other 
words, the specific traits or capabilities of the wrongdoer would be used by 
the court, but only when deciding who to compare the wrongdoer to.
As will be further discussed in Part III.B, both normative and positive 
measurements of reasonableness could be easily applied to thinking algo-
rithms, regardless of how different their decision-making is compared to 
that of humans and their ever-evolving capabilities.
iii. Understanding the Exact Reason for Reaching the Damaging 
Decision is Unnecessary
Although having more information on the damaging decision and how 
it was reached can assist in determining reasonableness, the assessment can 
be made without a precise understanding of the reasons behind the decision. 
To take an example of a driver hitting a pedestrian with his car, knowing 
that the driver swerved in an attempt to avoid hitting a different pedestrian 
54. Froomkin et al., supra note 2, at 51–58.
55. Id. at 54 (“The standard of care is that established by the ‘relevant community’,
which is now understood to be the national group of practitioners in that specialty.”); see also
Philip G. Peters, The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millenni-
um, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 180 (2000); John W. Ely et al., Determining the Standard 
of Care in Medical Malpractice: The Physician’s Perspective, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861, 
862 (2002).
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would be relevant to the analysis. However, a court could still determine 
whether the driver’s conduct was reasonable even if the driver couldn’t pro-
vide any information about how or why he hit the pedestrian.
56
In the medical malpractice context, understanding how or why a physi-
cian misdiagnosed a certain medical condition would be relevant in as-
sessing the reasonableness of the misdiagnosis. If the doctor’s decision was 
based on erroneous information given by the patient, this could lead to a 
finding of reasonableness, so long as it was reasonable of the physician to 
rely on such information without further investigation. If instead the physi-
cian confused one medical condition with another for no apparent reason,
57
the court can still determine whether the physician’s action was reasonable. 
Rather than focusing on the source of the mistake, the court could use a pos-
itive analysis to determine whether the physician was in line with protocols 
and customs, or alternatively it could use a normative economic analysis 
and assume the values of the parameters. In other words, another dimension 
that renders the reasonableness analysis adaptive, flexible, and easy to apply 
is its capacity to be used even in the absence of a profound understanding of 
why exactly the wrongdoer acted as they did (a trait which characterizes 
self-learning algorithms).
Part II: Thinking Algorithms and their Decision-Making Process
A. Background
Automated systems have been utilized by humankind for centuries.
58
In 
addition to assisting humans with physical tasks, machines have long been 
used to assist or replace humans in processing data. The electronic calcula-
tor enables engineers and other professionals to provide faster, more accu-
rate outputs,
59
autopilot controls in airplanes improve flight safety through 
an automated system capable of processing huge amounts of information in 
split seconds,
60
and cruise control and auto-parking devices assist everyday 
56. Driver v. Brooks, 10 S.E.2d 887, 892 (Va. 1940) (Virginia Supreme Court affirmed 
jury finding that defendant driver was liable for accident that he did not remember, stating 
“[l]iability for acts constituting negligence is not removed by a mere statement of the tort-
feasor that he does not remember the circumstances.”).
57. For a discussion of human inherent weaknesses, see infra notes 93–99 and accom-
panying text.
58. See IBN AL-RAZZAZ AL-JAZARI, THE BOOK OF KNOWLEDGE OF INGENIOUS 
MECHANICAL DEVICES (Donald R. Hill trans., Pakistan Hijra Council 1989) (1974).
59. See Electronic Calculators—Handheld, NAT’L MUSEUM AM. HISTORY, 
http://americanhistory.si.edu/collections/object-groups/handheld-electronic-calculators (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2021); Nick Valentine, The History of the Calculator, CALCULATOR SITE, 
https://www.thecalculatorsite.com/articles/units/history-of-the-calculator.php (Mar. 11, 2019).
60. Kyle Colonna, Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability, 4 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. &
INTERNET 81, 93–97 (2012); M. C. Elish & Tim Hwang, Praise the Machine! Punish the Hu-
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drivers.
61
Despite the increasing sophistication of these machines and devic-
es, mankind has only fairly recently begun to develop machine-learning sys-
tems. Often referred to as deep learning, artificial intelligence, autonomous 
systems, or thinking algorithms,
62
technologies that are based on self-
learning abilities are capable of solving tasks which involve more than one 
domain.
63
Scholars have deemed machine-learning a potential “game-
changer” in both technological and legal spaces.
64
But this technological advancement does not come without challenges 
and concerns.
65
Fast-paced thinking algorithms raise general fears of en-
trusting too much learning power to the hands of machines, to the point 
man! The Contradicting History of Accountability in Automated Aviation (Data & Soc’y Rsch. 
Inst., Compar. Stud. Intelligent Sys., Working Paper No. 1 V2, 2015), http://dx.doi.org
/10.2139/ssrn.2720477.
61. Ralph Teetor and the History of Cruise Control, AM. SAFETY COUNCIL,
https://blog.americansafetycouncil.com/history-of-cruise-control-2 (last visited Mar. 15, 
2021); A Brief History of Cruise Control, FRONTIER CHRYSLER (July 20, 2016), 
https://www.frontierchrysler.ca/history-cruise-control; Stephanie Levis, Look, Ma, No Hands: 
Self-Parking Cars Take the Wheel, GEICO, https://www.geico.com/more/driving/auto/car-
safety-insurance/look-ma-no-hands-parking-technology-takes-the-wheel (last visited Mar. 15, 
2021).
62. These are all broad terms which I will very generally group together under systems 
that can “think”, in the sense that they may learn from experience and reach results that were 
not predetermined in an injective manner. For a detailed discussion of the various definitions 
of the term “autonomy”, see Karni A. Chagal-Feferkorn, Am I an Algorithm or a Product? 
When Products Liability Should Apply to Algorithmic Decision-Makers, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 61 (2019).
63. In general, artificial intelligence systems are divided into “weak AI,” which is ca-
pable of focusing on a specific task domain, and “strong AI,” which is capable of solving 
tasks associated with multiple domains. See, e.g., Kathleen Walch, Rethinking Weak vs. 
Strong AI, FORBES (Oct. 4, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld
/2019/10/04/rethinking-weak-vs-strong-ai/#7421c6d96da3.
64. Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 513 
(2015) (“Robotics will prove ‘exceptional’ in the sense of occasioning systematic changes to 
law, institutions, and the legal academy.”).
65. From the legal perspective, certain core principles are put to question when the de-
cision-maker is no longer human but rather an algorithm. Criminal liability, for example, of-
ten requires “intent” by the offender, an element which naturally is difficult to reconcile with 
an algorithm. See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Gurney, Driving into the Unknown: Examining the Cross-
roads of Criminal Law and Autonomous Vehicles, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 393, 419–29
(2015); Jeffrey K. Gurney, Crashing into the Unknown: An Examination of Crash-
Optimization Algorithms Through the Two Lanes of Ethics and Law, 79 ALB. L. REV. 183, 
240–44 (2016) (discussing the difficulties of determining criminal liability with respect to 
driverless cars). In antitrust law, although intent of anticompetitive behavior may be imputed 
at the firm level, see D. Daniel Sokol, Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust?, 60 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1545, 1590–93 (2019), the question of imputing intent to the algorithms themselves 
(for example, in coordinating prices) must be addressed, see, e.g., Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust 
and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1323, 1324–
31 (2015). Contract law, to give another example, requires a “meeting of the minds” for a con-
tract to form. Can such be achieved when obligations are undertaken by an algorithm? See, 
e.g., Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 2 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128, 132–33
(2017).
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where mankind will neither have control nor an intellectual advantage over 
the very machines it created.
66
Even if such a threshold were never 
reached,
67
the fact that thinking algorithms are starting to deliver better re-
sults than humans in various fields,
68
combined with the fact that their deci-
sions are often inexplicable or non-transparent,
69
raises considerable con-
cerns regarding a future where people are subject to significant decisions 
whose accuracy and fairness could not be questioned.
70
At the same time, 
the enormous potential of thinking algorithms to save lives, improve quality 
of life, and assist economic growth is incomparable with any other type of 
technology ever seen before.
71
Therefore, determining how to balance the 
66. See, e.g., Bob Lambrechts, May It Please the Algorithm, J. KAN. BAR ASS’N, Jan. 
2020, at 38, 38 (“According to Ray Kurtzweil, an American inventor, futurist and director of 
engineering at Google, by 2045, computers utilizing artificial intelligence will surpass human 
intelligence.”); Ryan Dowell, Fundamental Protections for Non-Biological Intelligences or: 
How We Learn to Stop Worrying and Love Our Robot Brethren, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
305, 306–07 (2018) (referring to a singularity, “a theoretical event in which humans create a 
technology that leads to a domino effect of rapidly escalating, self-improving intelligence”); 
Rory Cellan-Jones, Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence Could End Mankind, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540; Maureen Dowd, 
Elon Musk’s Billion-Dollar Crusade to Stop the A.I. Apocalypse, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 26, 
2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/03/elon-musk-billion-dollar-crusade-to-stop-ai-
space-x (explaining that tech entrepreneur Elon Musk fears AI so much that he wants to colo-
nize Mars as a “bolt-hole if A.I. goes rogue and turns on humanity”).
67. See Dowell, supra note 66, at 315 (identifying author John Searle and Google’s
head of AI research as two people who consider a singularity as fantasy).
68. In the medical context, for example, algorithms have shown to outperform physi-
cians in several medical tasks, including predicting heart attacks and diagnosing brain tumors. 
Yamei, China Focus: AI Beats Human Doctors in Neuroimaging Recognition Contest,
XINHUANET (June 30, 2018, 10:48 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/30
/c_137292451.htm; Lulu Chang, Machine Learning Algorithms Surpass Doctors at Predicting 
Heart Attacks, DIGIT. TRENDS (Apr. 17, 2017), http://www.digitaltrends.com/health-fitness
/ai-algorithm-heart-attack; Ian Steadman, IBM’s Watson Is Better at Diagnosing Cancer than 
Human Doctors, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2013), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ibm-watson-
medical-doctor. For additional examples, see Froomkin et al., supra note 2, 39–44.
69. See infra notes 79–85 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Cade Metz & Adam Satariano, An Algorithm That Grants Freedom, or 
Takes It Away, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/technology
/predictive-algorithms-crime.html (“The algorithm is one of many making decisions about 
people’s lives in the United States and Europe. Local authorities use so-called predictive algo-
rithms to set police patrols, prison sentences and probation rules. In the Netherlands, an algo-
rithm flagged welfare fraud risks. A British city rates which teenagers are most likely to be-
come criminals.”); Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 659, 665–
66 (2018) (stating both that “[p]rivately-developed algorithms have come to occupy a key role 
in criminal justice processes” and that the assertion of trade secret protection by the creators 
of the algorithms “cripples courts and defense counsel—and sometimes prosecutors, as well—
from ensuring accuracy in criminal justice”).
71. W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 
432 (2017) (with respect to algorithms in the field of medical treatment, stating that 
“[a]voiding the implementation of algorithms because we fear the problems that might arise 
means leaving in place a system of medical errors that we know already exist, and foregoing 
the potential benefits of innovative treatment options that can save lives”); Ric Simmons, Big 
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desire to quickly develop and deploy such life-saving systems with the need 
to maintain adequate safeguards against their potential harms is an extreme-
ly delicate yet critical task.
72
What renders thinking algorithms so different from other types of au-
tomated and information-processing systems?
73
It is challenging for scholars 
to define and make a distinction between artificial intelligence (AI) systems 
and non-AI systems, given that “artificial intelligence” is a broad, non-
binary classification, and by nature is dynamic and ever-changing.
74
It is 
similarly challenging to define “thinking algorithms.” One key characteris-
tic of thinking algorithms, however, is their ability to be trained and to im-
prove their capabilities as a result. Unlike systems that are pre-programmed 
to execute a certain task in a well-defined manner, thinking algorithms are 
trained to learn how to achieve a certain mission.
75
As computer science 
professor Suresh Venkatasubramanian describes, while “traditional” algo-
rithms follow a recipe that a human has created and inputted, thinking algo-
rithms learn on their own how to create the recipe based on the manner in 
which they were trained, the data on which they trained, and the subsequent 
conclusions they have drawn from that information.
76
The training program of algorithms sometimes entails feeding enor-
mous amounts of data to the algorithm, accompanied by right and wrong 
answers. Under this approach, referred to as “supervised learning”, thinking 
algorithms can develop a model for predicting the right answer for similar 
datasets that were not included in the training. A greater degree of freedom 
to come up with their own conclusions or recognize their own patterns is 
given to algorithms that are “unsupervised.” Here, algorithms are fed the 
same amount of data but are not provided any answers, leaving the system 
Data, Machine Judges, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System, 52 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1067, 1070–71 (2018) (pointing out the following advantages of self-driving cars: “they 
will be safer; reduce traffic congestion; offer increased fuel efficiency; and make automobiles 
accessible to segments of the population that were unable to drive cars in the past”; suggesting 
that algorithms in the criminal justice system may be able to “produce decisions that are more 
fair, efficient, and accurate than human judgment”).
72. Price, supra note 71, at 474 (“And while medicine may be especially salient, ma-
chine-learning algorithms create risks and benefits that will need to be addressed, measured, 
and regulated in many contexts.”).
73. For an analysis of how to differentiate between “products” and “thinking algo-
rithms”, see Chagal-Feferkorn, supra note 62.
74. Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 300, 404 (2017) (“There is no straightforward, consensus definition of artificial intel-
ligence.”); Bryan Casey & Mark A. Lemley, You Might Be a Robot, 105 CORNELL. L. REV.
287, 294 (2019) (“And, in the end, it might be impossible to come up with a satisfying defini-
tion that regulates only the robots or humans we really want to. This is particularly true be-
cause the nature of robots is changing fast, and legal definitions set with today’s technology in 
mind will rapidly become obsolete.”).
75. Tutt, supra note 23, at 94–95.
76. Suresh Venkat, When an Algorithm Isn’t. . ., MEDIUM (Oct 2, 2015), 
https://medium.com/@geomblog/when-an-algorithm-isn-t-2b9fe01b9bb5.
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free to decipher patterns in the data that may indicate the right answer.
77
Levels of freedom entrusted within the unsupervised system may require 
very little human involvement throughout the entire process:
[W]e will soon no longer need (or wish) to provide algorithms with 
hard-coded hints about how to solve problems. Instead, algorithms 
will be provided with some basic tools for solving problems, and 
then left to construct for themselves tools to solve intermediate 
problems, on the way to achieving abstract goals.
78
B. Predictability and Explainability
As thinking algorithms possess the freedom and unrivaled computation-
al abilities to learn from past experiences and discover hidden patterns,
79
they often yield unpredictable outputs. In fact, not only are such algorithms 
designed to outsmart the limits of the human mind by drawing conclusions 
based on massive amounts of data,
80
they also often incorporate online data-
bases into their decision-making processes and may update their prediction 
models after each decision they make. In short, unless the human program-
mer designs the algorithm to require authorization for each decision it 
makes, the algorithm is able to reach conclusions based on new information 
that the programmer never has the chance to consider.
81
Moreover, much of 
the information affecting the algorithm’s decision-making may be dynamic 
and constantly changing.
82
In keeping with our inability to predict the choic-
es of thinking algorithms, thinking algorithms are considered black boxes 
whose inputs and outputs are known but whose decision-making process 
77. See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 93–95
(2014); Org. for Econ. Co-op. & Dev. [OECD], It’s a Feature, Not a Bug: On Learning Algo-
rithms and What They Teach Us – Note by Avigdor Gal, at 3, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP
/WD(2017)50 (June 7, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)50/en
/pdf.
78. Tutt, supra note 23, at 100–01.
79. See infra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
80. See P.J.G. Lisboa, Interpretability in Machine Learning – Principles and Practice,
in FUZZY LOGIC AND APPLICATIONS 15 (Francesco Masulli et al. eds., 2013); RODNEY A.
BROOKS, FLESH AND MACHINES: HOW ROBOTS WILL CHANGE US (2002); Calo, supra note 
64, at 550–558; Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 679
(2017).
81. Kroll et al., supra note 80, at 660 (“‘Online’ machine learning systems can update 
their model for predictions after each decision, incorporating each new observation as part of 
their training data. Even knowing the source code and data for such systems is not enough to 
replicate or predict their behavior—we also must know precisely how and when they interact-
ed or will interact with their environment.”).
82. For a more detailed discussion of algorithms’ unpredictability, see, e.g., Chagal-
Feferkorn, supra note 21, at 133–135.
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remains mysterious and inexplicable.
83
Although several technological 
measures could be used in order to better understand choices made by the 
algorithm (for example, annotating code with assertions that signal if the 
program crashes, or having the program log certain actions in a file before 
or after they have taken place),
84
many believe that the sheer volume of data 
at the basis of algorithms’ functionality would prevent humans from tracing 
a particular decision back to a specific, tangible reason.
85
C. Strengths and Weaknesses of Algorithms Versus Humans in 
Decision-Making
In a growing number of fields, algorithms are achieving better results, 
on average, than their human counterparts.
86
Society therefore has an inter-
est in relinquishing more decision-making powers to thinking algorithms.
87
However, while thinking algorithms may be superior to human cognitive 
abilities, they are certainly far from perfect and are likely to cause damage.
88
83. Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in
Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 184–85 (2017) (“algorithmic decision-making
is essentially concealed behind a veil of code, which is often protected under trade secrecy
law, and even when it is not, its mathematical complexity and learning capacities make it im-
penetrable”); Michael Luca et al., Algorithms Need Managers, Too, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–
Feb. 2016, at 96 (“Algorithms are black boxes. . . . [They] often can predict the future with
great accuracy but tell you neither what will cause an event nor why.”).
84. Additional approaches can include: organizing the code into modules that can be 
evaluated separately; providing a specification of the program’s behavior as well as proof that 
could be automatically evaluated to check whether the code satisfies this specification. Kroll 
et al., supra note 80, at 663–65.
85. See id.; see Cesare Bartolini et al., Critical Features of Autonomous Road 
Transport from the Perspective of Technological Regulation and Law, 27 TRANSP. RSCH.
PROCEDIA 791, 796–798 (2017) (“[I]n AI-based systems, it is hard to identify the exact reason 
that led to a certain decision. As the training of the AI involves configuring millions of con-
nections by means of a training phase, backtracing the decision to the exact training set of in-
puts that stimulated those connections is considered an almost impossible task.”).
86. See Yamei, supra note 68 for examples related to the medical field. In the field of 
transportation, as well, driverless vehicles are already demonstrating improved safety meas-
ured by number of casualties as well as injuries resulting from car accidents. See, e.g., Bryant 
Walker Smith, Automated Driving and Product Liability, 1 MICH. ST. L. REV. 7–20 (2017); 
Chris Isidore, Self-driving Cars Are Already Really Safe, CNN BUS. (Mar. 21, 2018),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/21/technology/self-driving-car-safety.
87. “[A]ccording to evidence-based practice, if there is good evidence to suggest that a 
particular action produces the most favorable outcomes, then that action is the most justifiable 
one. . . . Once there are expert robots, it will be easier to argue in some instances that they 
ought to be used to their full potential, because the evidence will suggest that in those instanc-
es they will, on average, deliver better results than human experts.” Jason Millar & Ian Kerr, 
Delegation, Relinquishment and Responsibility: The Prospect of Expert Robots, in ROBOT 
LAW 116–117 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016).
88. For a list of notorious AI failures in 2018 (some involving tasks where algorithms 
are assumed to achieve better results than humans), see 2018 in Review: 10 AI Failures,
SYNCED REV. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://medium.com/syncedreview/2018-in-review-10-ai-
failures-c18faadf5983.
236 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 27:213
In certain situations, a thinking algorithm may be incapable of avoiding 
harm.
89
In other circumstances, harm may be avoidable yet would involve 
no fault if it occurred.
90
However, for a significant proportion of harmful 
decisions, the harm itself is both avoidable and unjustifiable. The underlying 
legal question of whether these damages should have been avoided would 
then constitute the basis of a reasonableness or other type of legal analysis. 
But before we consider the applicability of the reasonableness analysis to 
algorithms, it is important to first examine the differences in the decision-
making process of humans versus that of algorithms and their respective ad-
vantages and weaknesses. Analyzing these differences will illuminate 
whether it is a good idea to apply reasonableness analysis to algorithms and 
will also influence how best to do so.
There are many similarities between the decision-making process of 
humans and algorithms. First, both humans and algorithms make decisions 
using the same four-stage cycle, referred to as the “OODA Loop cycle,” 
comprising of: “observe,” which refers to information-acquisition; “orient,” 
which refers to information analysis; “decide,” where the information gath-
ered and analyzed in the preceding two steps is used to select a decision; 
and “act,” which is the final stage of implementing the chosen decision.
91
Second, many of the skills and capabilities that make humans good or 
expert decision-makers are ones characteristic of algorithms as well, but to a 
greater degree: the existence of a vast and well-organized knowledge base, 
the ability to handle large amounts of data and to automate certain sequenc-
es of actions, and the ability to derive insights from information—even if 
the information is of low quality or followed by irrelevant “noises.”92
89. To take the example of a driverless vehicle deciding whether to swerve to the right 
and hit another car or hit the car in front of it, either scenario will result in damage, and the 
question would only be which of the two choices is less damaging. For a detailed discussion 
of unavoidable harms and ‘least-cost’ harms caused by robots see Lemley & Casey, supra 
note 27, at 1327–31.
90. Sophisticated systems, in particular self-learning algorithms, rely on probability-
based predictions, and probabilities by nature inevitably “get it wrong” some of the time. Fo-
cusing on the damage caused due to a patient or user being on the “bad side of the statistics”
does not mean the thinking algorithm erred. For a more detailed discussion, see Chagal-
Feferkorn, supra note 62, at 63, 84–85.
91. See FRANS P.B. OSINGA, SCIENCE, STRATEGY AND WAR: THE STRATEGIC THEORY 
OF JOHN BOYD 1–3 (1st ed. 2006). Naturally, many decisions require a constant flow within
the loop. In medicine, for example, a physician will gather and analyze information on the
patient, and then often their decision will be to send the patient for additional tests, so that the
results could then be “put back” into the physician’s OODA loop decision-making process
when deciding whether to request any further exams, prescribe a certain medicine, hospitalize
the patient, and so on. Once a medical diagnosis or medical treatment decision has been made,
it is naturally always subject to further decision-making processes comprising the OODA loop
stages, verifying that the diagnosis was correct, that the treatment is efficient, that the patient
still requires it, and so on.
92. See generally Itiel E. Dror, The Paradox of Human Expertise: Why Experts Get It 
Wrong, in THE PARADOXICAL BRAIN 177, 179 (Narinder Kapur ed., 2011); Vimla L. Patel et 
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Nevertheless, there are also very significant differences in the decision-
making process of humans and algorithms, which will naturally affect the 
standard of reasonableness to which we can, and should, hold them. Algo-
rithms boast various strengths compared to humans, which often translate 
into better cognitive performance. First, algorithms have the ability to com-
pute a huge amount of data, so vast that the human mind cannot grasp it, at 
an incomparable speed.
93
In addition to their elevated computational abili-
ties, thinking algorithms do not have self-interests affecting their judg-
ment,
94
they do not omit any of the decision-making stages,
95
and they are 
not subject to human physical or mental limitations such as exhaustion, 
stress, or emotionality.
96
Though algorithms are often accused of being bi-
ased,
97
there are at least certain types of cognitive biases that affect humans 
but not algorithms.
98
Lastly, an algorithm that is put to commercial or mass 
al., Expertise and Tacit Knowledge in Medicine, in TACIT KNOWLEDGE IN PROFESSIONAL 
PRACTICE: RESEARCHER AND PRACTITIONER PERSPECTIVES 75, 75 (Robert J. Sternberg & 
Joseph A. Horvath eds., 1999); see also Beverly P. Wood, Visual Expertise, RADIOLOGY, 
Apr. 1, 1999, at 1–3.
93. See infra notes 113–115 and accompanying text.
94. A human physician conducting research on a certain type of cancer, for instance, 
might unconsciously select one diagnosis over another because the former would make the 
patient a candidate for their research. Unless programmed to take such considerations into 
account, an algorithm would not.
95. This may thus guarantee a meticulous analysis in each and every case, and at the 
same time avoid biases based on routine (such as an attorney always citing the same precedent 
without examining alternatives that may be better suited to particular circumstances, or a phy-
sician prescribing a certain medicine even though a different drug might be more efficient for 
a certain patient). See Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV.
J. L. & TECH. 309, 321 (2017).
96. “[I]n my opinion . . ., one’s behavior cannot be controlled at all times by reason or 
logic, and emotional stress will have a great influence on one’s conduct.” Petersen v. Honolu-
lu, 462 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Haw. 1969).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Maclin, No. 19-cr-122-pp, 2019 WL 3240745 at *3 (E.D. 
Wis. 2019) (defendant in a criminal case arguing that an algorithm used in Milwaukee was 
“biased against black people”); Arthur Rizer & Caleb Watney, Artificial Intelligence Can 
Make Our Jail System More Efficient, Equitable, and Just, 23 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 181, 210 
(2018) (“The core critique here is that algorithms are not completely neutral and objective 
tools, as they can be biased through the improper curation of data and the selection of varia-
bles the algorithms will seek to optimize towards.”).
98. An algorithm, for instance, would not base its decisions on the “availability heuris-
tic.” The availability heuristic refers to people’s tendency to base their estimations of the like-
lihood of certain events on prior knowledge that is easily retrievable. The more dramatic, 
emotional, or unusual an event is, the better people tend to recall it, and inaccurately base their 
estimations on it. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgement Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128 (1974). A human lawyer asked to predict a 
judge’s reactions to a certain argument, for example, may recall the judge reprimanding them
for raising a similar argument, and will therefore overestimate the likelihood of the judge re-
acting negatively to their argument. An algorithm, on the other hand, will be affected by the 
database it “trained” on (and therefore if the data was not representative it would yield poor 
results), but it would systematically analyse all prior incidents and give them an equal weight, 
without relying on a particular emotional event. For more discussion on law, heuristics, and 
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use will likely have been extensively tested and selected over other inferior 
algorithms. This is in contrast to human decision-makers, as both poor and 
high-quality decision-makers may still share the same road or profession.99
Such advantages render thinking algorithms superior to human deci-
sion-makers in a growing number of fields. But algorithms are not better 
than humans in every aspect. From a technical perspective, although algo-
rithms are not subject to human frailties such as fatigue or stress, they are at 
risk of suffering from technical malfunctions or being vulnerable to cyber-
attacks and gaming attempts by users.
100
Even when operating smoothly, 
certain algorithmic characteristics can cause the algorithm to make basic or 
clumsy mistakes that a human is highly unlikely to make, such as classify-
ing photos of people as gorillas
101
or naming Toronto as a U.S. city during 
the Jeopardy! championship.102
Although algorithms’ potential for knowledge of facts (referred to as 
“declarative” knowledge, or “how-to” knowledge)
103
is enormous, they are 
still lacking when it comes to tacit knowledge, or the “things you just know 
how to do without being able to explain the rules for how you do them.”
104
Algorithms also lack both creativity and flexibility, which are often im-
biases see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics 4 (Chicago John M. Olin L. & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 180, 2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics 1 (Chicago John M. 
Olin L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 165); Russel Korobkin, The Problems with Heuristics 
for Law 3–4 (UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, L. & ECON. RSCH. PAPER SERIES, 2004). It should be 
noted, however, that even if algorithms do not base their decisions directly on heuristics or 
biases, their decisions might nevertheless be affected by “hidden” biases (as is argued, for ex-
ample, in the context of algorithms in the service of the criminal justice system). See Matthias 
Leese, The New Profiling: Algorithms, Black Boxes, and the Failure of Anti-Discriminatory 
Safeguards in the European Union, 45 SEC. DIALOGUE 494, 494–95 (2014); Toon Calders & 
Sicco Verwer, Three Naïve Bayes Approaches for Discrimination-Free Classification, 21 
DATA MINING & KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY 277, 277–78 (2010). Solon Barocas & Andrew D. 
Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671 (2016).
99. Khosla, supra note 12.
100. Importantly, the negative outcome of an algorithm making erroneous decisions (due 
to malfunction of some sort, or in general) could far exceed that of a human. This is because 
an algorithmic error might be duplicated to all other algorithms making that same decision, 
unlike a human whose decisions could vary from the ones made by other decision-makers. 
Eliav Lieblich & Eyal Benvenisti, The Obligation to Exercise Discretion in Warfare: Why 
Autonomous Weapon Systems Are Unlawful, in AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS: LAW,
ETHICS, POLICY 245, 272 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2016).
101. See Alistair Barr, Google Mistakenly Tags Black People as ‘Gorillas,’ Showing 
Limits of Algorithms, DOW JONES INSTITUTIONAL NEWS (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/07/01/google-apologizesafter-photos-identify-
black-people-as-gorillas/29567465.
102. See Steve Hamm, Watson on Jeopardy! Day Two: The Confusion Over an Airport 
Clue, BUILDING A SMARTER PLANET (Feb. 15, 2011, 7:30 PM), http://web.archive.org/web
/20160422135346/http://asmarterplanet.com/blog/2011/02/watson-onjeopardy-day-two-the-
confusion-over-an-airport-clue.html.
103. Dror, supra note 92, at 178.
104. HARRY COLLINS & ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING EXPERTISE 13 (2008).
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portant factors in becoming an expert in a professional field.
105
Similarly, 
algorithms are inferior to humans in adjusting their decisions when they en-
counter new parameters that were not part of their training process, or when 
such adjustments are not in line with their programmed limitation.
106
Anoth-
er aspect of algorithms’ unhelpful rigidity is that, unlike human decision-
makers, they do not discuss their decisions with colleagues and peers. 
Thinking algorithms therefore have fewer opportunities to identify errors or 
tweak the decision based on other perspectives.
107
In addition, although al-
gorithms’ abilities outperform humans’ in many aspects, they face an inher-
ent disadvantage when making decisions calling for certain human traits that 
they are not yet capable of copying, such as intuition or any other trait relat-
ed to tacit versus formal knowledge.
108
Lastly, though algorithms may boast 
unparalleled abilities in analyzing enormous volumes of data and identify-
ing patterns—at a level beyond the capacity of the human brain—their con-
tinued improvement in certain fields might very well depend on additional 
feedback received from humans. Fields characterized by having no clear-cut 
determinations or golden standards agreed on by humans will likely repli-
cate a given problem to algorithmic decision-makers as well.
109
Moreover, if 
decision-making authority is exclusively relinquished to algorithms, then 
the lack of additional training data produced by humans (who would no 
longer possess the necessary expertise in the fields taken over by algo-
rithms) will prevent detection of algorithmic mistakes and set the quality of 
their performance at a stagnant level.
110
How do these general characteristics, as well as more specific technical 
abilities and limitations, come into play in the decision-making process of 
an algorithm, and thus shape the potential reasonableness we would be able 
105. “Automation” is, in fact, a source of concern when assessing the performances of 
human experts, given that flexibility and creativity are essential for their functioning. Dror,
supra note 92, at 182.
106. Lieblich & Benvenisti, supra note 100, at 29; Thomas J. Barth & Eddy F. Arnold, 
Artificial Intelligence and Administrative Discretion, 29 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 332, 338 
(1999).
107. Lieblich & Benvenisti, supra note 100, at 1, 29.
108. “For instance, [algorithms] might be less accurate than humans in detecting nuanc-
es or human body language or gestures indicating that a person is deliberately feeding them 
inaccurate information.” Chagal-Feferkorn, supra note 21, at 145.
109. Adewole S. Adamson & H. Gilbert Welch, Machine Learning and Cancer-
Diagnosis Problem: No Gold Standard, 381 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2285, 2286 (2019).
110. Froomkin et. al., supra note 2, at 36: “Many ML systems are not easily audited or 
understood by human physicians, and if this remains true, it will be harder to detect sub-par 
performance, jeopardizing the system’s efficacy, accuracy, and reliability. Once ML systems 
displace doctors in a specialty, the demand for such doctors will shrink, as will training oppor-
tunities for human experts. Because we will continue to need humans to generate much of the 
training data for future ML systems, this reduction in human competence may create road-
blocks to the continuing improvement of ML systems, especially once new diagnostic sensors 
are available.”
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to demand of it? To deconstruct the decision-making process of both hu-
mans and algorithms we shall use John Boyd’s “OODA Loop cycle” men-




The OODA loop’s first stage consists of the decision-maker observing 
the environment in order to collect information that will later be used to 
make a decision. While human decision-makers make use of their senses in 
order to collect information, thinking algorithms may collect information 
using sensors, video cameras, etc.
112
The capabilities of a decision-maker 
(be it human or algorithmic) in the stage of information-acquisition depend 
on the decision-maker’s ability to locate the information (at times, it will in 
turn depend on their ability to know that the information exists in the first 
place), and then to access it. It also depends on their ability to collect the in-
formation and store it in a manner that will allow the second stage of infor-
mation analysis.
As far as the information-acquisition stage is concerned, algorithmic 
decision-makers boast abilities that are far beyond those of humans. Both 
knowledge of potentially relevant information and the ability to access and 
collect information are classic examples of where humans are very limited, 
but for algorithms, the sky is the limit. First, the dimension of time grants 
algorithms an incomparable advantage over humans. Not only do algorithms 
have a much better starting point in terms of free time (having no obliga-
tions or need to eat or sleep), but they are also able to run multiple simulta-
neous actions when searching for information, whereas humans’ multitask-
ing abilities are much more limited.
113
Moreover, the processing power of 
algorithms is incomparably greater than that of humans,
114
allowing them in 
111. See generally Osinga, supra note 91.
112. RICHARD A. POISEL, INFORMATION WARFARE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE 
SYSTEMS 29 (Artech House, 2013).
113. Lauren A. Newell, Redefining Attention (and Revamping the Legal Profession?) for 
the Digital Generation, 15 NEV. L.J. 754, 766 (2015) (pointing out that “[a]t any given time, 
we face severe limits in the number of choices that we can select, the number of tasks that we 
can execute, and the number of responses that we can generate, along with the limits in the 
number of items that can be maintained in working memory” and explaining that multitasking 
comes with significant efficiency costs).
114. Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 95, at 318. (“[t]he most basic advantage of algo-
rithms is that they enable a speedier decision. Given any number of decisional parameters and 
data sources, computers can apply the relevant algorithm far more quickly than the human 
brain . . . . [In an example of trying to find the best deal for a product] [a]n algorithm may be 
able to compare a vastly greater number of offers in the same time.”).
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mere seconds to complete tasks that might take a human hours or even days 
to finish.
115
Second, thinking algorithms have an advantage of scale. If a human 
wants to improve their skill in searching, identifying, and collecting relevant 
sources of information, that human would work alone to improve their own 
skill, and that human alone would enjoy the fruits of their efforts. However, 
in the case of thinking algorithms, large teams of coders all work together to 
enhance the algorithm’s abilities. Any improvements made to one thinking 
algorithm can be directly used to improve other algorithms. Take for exam-
ple learning how to read Japanese. In order for a human to become highly 
proficient in the language, that individual would likely have to invest hun-
dreds, if not thousands of hours before they could easily read Japanese text. 
From an economic point of view, investing such efforts to be able to under-
stand text is likely not justifiable if the human is a physician who wants to 
learn Japanese in order to be able to read Japanese-language medical stud-
ies. However, the same does not hold true for an algorithm. Although teach-
ing an algorithm how to read Japanese might require a significant effort, 
once the algorithm has learned how to read Japanese, all units of the system 
(potentially millions of them) would have that capability. Developing algo-
rithms’ ability to reach and access even the most difficult to access infor-
mation, therefore, might very well be economically justifiable when devel-
oping a human’s ability would not.
As a result of these two advantages, thinking algorithms’ ability to iden-
tify and access sources of various languages, of various media platforms, of 
various content types, and of enormous volume reaches far beyond the ca-
pabilities of human decision-makers. A medical algorithm, for example, 
might be able to look for sources of information in all existing languages, 
while a human physician could not.
116
A driverless car could listen to all ra-
dio stations within a vicinity to collect information about nearby hazards, 
while simultaneously collecting information from other diversified plat-
forms such as navigation applications, consumer blogs, or online magazines. 
Moreover, unlike humans, thinking algorithms would not need to limit 
themselves to only searching for information directly about the situation at 
hand, but would be free to look for sources of information from completely 
different fields and potentially discover surprising correlations. While a hu-
man physician would likely collect information from medical journals, pro-
fessional protocols, and guidelines, a medical algorithm may look for addi-
115. Artificial Intelligence Singles Out Neurons Faster Than a Human Can, SCIENCE 
DAILY (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/04/190412150628.htm 
(describing an algorithm that can identify and segment neuros in minutes, a task that could 
take a trained human researcher up to 24 hours, assuming that the researcher is “fully focused 
for the duration and [doesn’t] take breaks to sleep, eat or use the bathroom.”).
116. In the field of medicine this could be meaningful—for example, in the context of 
viruses or parasites that are endemic for specific regions.
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tional data pertaining to the weather, levels of pollution, and levels of radia-
tion. The medical algorithm might then determine that such data is relevant 
in making a medical diagnosis or in determining the optimal treatment for a 
condition.
117
Lastly, the sheer volume of information that algorithms may 
access makes its information-acquisition stage look vastly different than a 
human’s information-acquisition stage. While a human driver is able to col-
lect information on the speed and distance of their own vehicle and identify 
the presence of other vehicles and pedestrians around them, a driverless ve-
hicle could theoretically identify all cars in a thirty mile radius and collect 
information on how these vehicles have been driving for the past minute, 
day, or week. Such information might alert the driverless car to drunk driv-
ers, generally dangerous drivers, or autonomous vehicles that seem to have 
malfunctioned. It could also access data on the mechanical condition of all 
other cars on the road, potentially informing on the extent to which each car 
might be damaged in case of an accident, in a manner that might be relevant 
to the notorious dilemma of which car to hit when a crash is unavoidable.
118
In the medical context, a human physician would be able to rely on many 
sources of information pertaining to the patient’s current and previous med-
ical condition, along with potential treatments and their risks, but a medical 
application would also be able to access medical records of billions of pa-
tients worldwide. This could allow the medical application to identify epi-
demic patterns in real time
119
or learn how effective different treatments are 
among populations that are less common at the patient’s current hospital.
The accuracy of the parameters collected is also very different where 
thinking algorithms are concerned. While a human driver might make a 
good estimation of their own speed even without consulting the speedome-
ter, the human is unlikely to accurately estimate the speed or distance of 
other objects. Estimations as to current wind speed would likely not be 
available to a human driver at all. A driverless car, on the other hand, would 
have an accurate numerical value for each of these variables.
As far as identifying and accessing relevant data is concerned, thinking 
algorithms boast abilities that are light-years ahead of those of humans. This 
does not mean, however, that algorithms will always be better at infor-
117. See, e.g., Isobel Braithwaite et al., Air Pollution (Particulate Matter) Exposure and 
Associations with Depression, Anxiety, Bipolar, Psychosis and Suicide Risk: A Systematic Re-
view and Meta-Analysis, 127 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. 126002-1, 126002-8 (2019) (using me-
ta-analysis accumulated over forty years and identifying correlation between pollution and 
depression). A thinking algorithm able to access relevant sources of information on pollution 
may reach such findings well before they are published in a paper.
118. For an ethical analysis of said dilemma and related ones, see Gurney, supra note 
65.
119. In 2009, Google’s algorithm was able to identify where the H1N1 virus was in real 
time using its users’ search terms. In contrast, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) relied on reports by physicians and identified where the virus had spread two weeks 
later than Google. See Tutt, supra note 23, at 97.
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mation-acquisition than humans, as humans possess both creativity and tacit 
knowledge. For instance, a patient mentioning that he visited a foreign
country recently might prompt a human physician to look for relevant 
sources of information relating to said country and thus correctly diagnosing 
the patient with an endemic disease, whereas an algorithm might not neces-
sarily have this conversation to begin with or might ignore this information 
as it is not directly related to the task of diagnosis.
120
As for storing collected information, algorithms clearly outpace humans 
in terms of memory capacity.
121
However, this does not necessarily mean 
that algorithms collect information in a meaningful way. Although algo-
rithms can be programmed to “understand” various languages and therefore 
would be able to extract information from text or potentially audio in any 
language, algorithms would be limited by their declarative knowledge
122
and 
would only be able to extract information that resembles that with which 
they are already familiar. Once exposed to a different layout, either older 
than the one the algorithm trained on or a new technological advancement, 
then information that would be obvious to a human would be incomprehen-
sible to an algorithm. For example, if a medical algorithm was only trained 
to decipher printed text, then the algorithm would completely miss any 
handwritten notes on the patient’s medical record. Similarly, if the patient 
had been sent for a series of scans and the hospital had just moved to a more 
advanced scanning technology providing higher-resolution images, a human 
physician might not detect the difference while an algorithmic doctor might 
fail to interpret the scan altogether.
123
The information-acquisition stage is therefore characterized by algo-
rithmic performance that is oftentimes vastly superior to that of humans. 
120. Even in cases where the algorithm is programmed, or decides on its own, to ask the 
patient about recent travels, it may still miss information that a person would have picked up. 
If, for example, the patient says he did not visit a foreign country, a human physician might be 
more likely than an algorithm to detect other indications revealing that the patient did indeed 
visit the foreign country. For instance, a patient may have visited several countries and forgot 
he also visited the one in question, perhaps because his illness caused him confusion, or be-
cause he may not wish to reveal his visit to that country. Also, if the patient mentions that he 
cut his knee when climbing Mount Fuji, a physician will conclude the patient travelled to Ja-
pan, where the algorithm might not. In such cases, only the human physician would know to 
look for sources of information relevant to endemic diseases in Japan.
121. Kris Sharma, How Does the Human Brain Compare to a Computer?, CRUCIAL 
(Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.crucial.com/usa/en/how-does-the-human-brain-compare-to-a-
computer (pointing out how humans can forget information, while computers never will).
122. See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
123. Froomkin et al., supra note 2, at 74 (“Imagine, for example, that someone invents a
higher-resolution scanner that takes sharper images than its predecessor. Human beings who
could recognise tumours on the old photos might have little or no difficulty recognising the
same tumours on the new, sharper images; ideally, humans might also be able to see new
things they had not been able to discern or become able to better distinguish previously am-
biguous results. Unfortunately, ML systems do not work like that. To an ML system, the new,
higher-resolution image is a completely new thing.”).
244 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 27:213
Concerns we might have over whether it is economically feasible for a hu-
man physician to read long medical records when treating patients with ur-
gent needs would likely not be applicable to a medical algorithm capable of 
collecting enormous amount of information in a split second. On the other 
hand, if a patient’s medical record included handwritten notes about aller-
gies, and the algorithm is not capable of deciphering those notes, then hu-
man information-acquisition would be clearly superior.
ii. “Orient” (Information-Analysis)
Similar to the “observe” stage of the OODA loop, the “orient” or in-
formation-analysis stage is greatly affected by technical abilities. In that 
sense, algorithms’ superior computational abilities are similarly advanta-
geous in this stage. Algorithms are able to analyze significantly more infor-
mation and in a more methodical manner than humans; once a certain 
threshold of parameters to consider is crossed, humans will no longer be 
able to assimilate additional parameters in their analysis.
124
A driverless car 
will therefore not only be able to collect data on all driving records of all 
vehicles surrounding it, but it will also be able to actually process this input 
in an insightful manner. Moreover, while humans weigh different parame-
ters based on their general knowledge and gut feelings, algorithms attach 
concrete numerical values to the different parameters based on statistics 
from past experiences.
Unlike the “observe” stage, however, the “orient” stage involves much 
more than technical-capability issues or the algorithm’s ability to complete a 
certain task. First, the information-analysis stage involves questions that are 
not exclusively a matter of ability: deciding which elements of the infor-
mation collected to disregard and which to take into account, along with ad-
dressing legal and ethical concerns.
125
A classic example is that of the self-
driving car just about to crash—the algorithm has to decide how much 
weight to attach to its driver’s chances of survival versus of those of other 
road users. Autonomous weapons similarly raise crucial legal and ethical 
questions with respect to how an algorithm decides how much weight it at-
taches to the presence of civilians versus the importance of the task at hand.
Second, an algorithm’s material decision of how much weight to attach 
to each parameter will, for better or worse, not be affected by emotions, un-
124. See Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 95, at 318 (“Given any number of decisional 
parameters and data sources, computers can apply the relevant algorithm far more quickly 
than the human brain.”).
125. Among the tasks involved in the orient stage is those of updating the decision mak-
er’s perception of the world, based on the information acquired in the previous stage, and then 
determine if and how desired goals are met under that new perception. Poisel, supra note 112, 
at 30. The analysis of the collected information therefore involves an input on what the system 
aims to achieve, in a manner that may involve nontrivial questions that require more than 
computation abilities.
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like a human decision-maker. A human physician treating a dying child 
may, out of compassion or optimism, attach a higher weight than an algo-
rithm would to a certain treatment that may only have a small chance of sav-
ing the child. Likewise, a human driver in danger of hitting a child may not, 
in the moment, be able to properly consider all the relevant factors and the 
actual chance of hitting the child, whereas an algorithm would likely take 
into account that the potentially injured party would be a child, but would at 
the same time impassively attach significant weight to other factors. In addi-
tion, algorithms and humans try to maximize different utility functions. For 
example, an algorithm might be taught to attach significant weight to cost-
efficiency considerations. A medical algorithm therefore might attach more 
weight to the price of a drug than the average human physician would, as 
the algorithm’s main goal might not be to cure patients but rather to balance 
budget considerations.
Another concern in deciding how to weigh parameters is bias. Human 
decision-makers may be susceptible to bias or to subconsciously focusing 
on their own welfare. A human physician might underrate parameters that 
indicate that a certain treatment is inferior to another treatment that she is 
also conducting research on, or when fatigued at the end of a long shift, she 
may overrate the significance of certain vital signs that indicate no emer-
gency treatment is needed when other signs indicate the opposite. Attaching 
significant weight to parameters based on self-interest or bias is also very 
prevalent in the context of autonomous vehicles. While a human driver 
would naturally attach significant weight to their own well-being (leading 
potentially to an instinctive decision to protect oneself at the expense of hit-
ting others), an algorithm might, depending on the choices of its manufac-
turer, seek to maximize “greater good” considerations and potentially give 
significant weight to the number of potential victims or the severity of po-
tential injury in order to choose the least-damaging action.
The “orient” stage, therefore, is characterized by both inherent technical 
advantages of algorithms over humans, but it also reflects material differ-
ences in their decision-making rationales and goals.
iii. “Decide” (Decision-Selection)
Having attached different weights to the myriad of parameters gathered 
during the information-acquisition process, the human or algorithmic deci-
sion-maker now has to make an actual decision based on their analysis and 
desired outcomes.
126
This stage involves more than might meet the eye, giv-
en that decisions are almost never a binary choice between two alternatives 
of right or wrong, but rather comprise of choices whose relative benefits and 
126. Id.
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risks can only be estimated by an iterative process of prediction.
127
Moreo-
ver, any choice of a certain treatment over others would not necessarily al-
low Pareto efficiency.
128
If one alternative has higher rates of success, lower 
chances of damage, and a lower cost, then choosing it would naturally be an 
easy decision to make as there is no need for either normative analysis or 
prioritization of different goals. However, if a treatment that has high recov-
ery rates is also associated with more severe side effects, then the decision-
maker would be required to factor in the level of risk aversion they feel 
comfortable with.
The stage of “deciding” therefore reflects similar differences between 
humans and thinking algorithms to those discussed in the prior stage. From 
a technical perspective, an algorithm has the capacity to decide between a 
very large number of alternatives, whereas the human brain is limited to tru-
ly evaluating only a few.
129
Furthermore, as with the action of data analysis, 
when deciding between the relevant options, a human would base its deci-
sion on a fuzzy estimation of why a certain alternative is favorable to anoth-
er, rather than on a numerical calculation.
Another difference between humans and thinking algorithms is the 
presence of instinct. When a human driver is faced with an impending acci-
dent and has to decide which direction to swerve the car, the human will 
make a choice, presumably the self-preserving one, between all possible op-
tions based on instinct.
130
Similarly, a human physician deciding between 
two different treatment approaches in an urgent life or death matter will 
likely also make her choice instinctively. The thinking algorithm, on the 
other hand, would make instant choices like humans, but these choices 
would be made after fully weighing the available options and not on in-
stinct. Certainly, human instinct may at times be sharper than the algorith-
mic process, as humans are able to factor in circumstances the algorithm 
may not be familiar with and would not know how to consider (this was 
very dramatically demonstrated in the U.S. Airways crash on the Hudson in 
2009).
131
But overall, thinking algorithms have the general advantage of be-
127. See, e.g., Barocas, supra note 98, at 681. For instance, the selection of a given med-
icine among many alternatives for a patient might involve an 80% likelihood that a certain 
tumour is indeed the type of tumour assumed, a 50% likelihood that it will respond well to a 
certain medicine, a 20% likelihood that its side effects would be acute, and so on.
128. Pareto efficiency refers to a reallocation of resources resulting in at least one com-
ponent is better off compared to the previous allocation, while all other components remain 
unharmed. A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING (Jonathan Law & John Smullen eds., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
129. See supra notes 113–115 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Giuseppe Contissa et al., The Ethical Knob: Ethically-Customisable Au-
tomated Vehicles and the Law, ARTIFICIAL INTEL. & L. 365, 368 (2017).
131. The famous “Miracle on the Hudson,” where U.S. Airways pilot Chesley “Sully”
Sullenberger safely performed an emergency landing after two of the airplane’s engines sud-
denly failed, is an example of human’s superiority in that context, given that pilot Sullen-
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ing able to make rational and well-thought-out decisions rather than instinc-
tive ones, even in times of emergency.
132
iv. “Act” (Action-Implementation)
The last stage—the actual execution of the decision made in the preced-
ing stage—is one generally characterized by algorithmic superiority for 
those decisions that require precision, such as administrating exact dosages 
by a radiation therapy machine, enabling very small corrections in the 
movement of a surgeon’s hands, or launching an air defense rocket in the 
split second that would allow its trajectory to collide with that of an aerial 
threat.
133
However, humans are better at making certain kinds of decisions 
that require an understanding of empathy and social nuances, such as a doc-
tor explaining to a patient that she has a terminal illness with no treatment 
options, or a priest engaging in religious confession with a parishioner. This 
stage emphasizes the difference between executing automated and non-
automated actions.
134
Whether an algorithm or a human will be more suc-
cessful at executing a particular action in this final stage will heavily depend 
on the type of action to be executed and whether that action requires preci-
sion or a form of tacit knowledge.
Although humans and thinking algorithms use the same four stages of 
the decision-making cycle, the two differ in how they operate within each 
stage. Humans undoubtedly reach their decisions in a different manner, 
which is reflected in all four stages of the decision-making process. Alt-
hough algorithms show superiority when making certain types of decisions, 
especially those related to the technical ability to collect and process enor-
mous amounts of information, algorithms also suffer from certain weak-
nesses compared to humans and may make certain mistakes that a human 
would not. The expectations we hold of each decision-maker, therefore, 
would vary in each of the decision-making stages. Our expectations will 
likely differ not only from the technical perspective of ability (which may 
berger made the “right decision,” in contrast to flight algorithms, which would have seeming-
ly led to a catastrophic crash. Clint Eastwood’s 2016 movie Sully focuses on that exact point. 
SULLY (Flashlight Films 2016). See also Adam Smith, The Miracle on The Hudson: How It 
Happened, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/films/sully/miracle-on-
the-hudson-how-it-happened.
132. See supra notes 68 and 86 (discussing examples where algorithms already outper-
form human decision makers, including in the context of autonomous vehicles and a reduced 
rate of car accidents).
133. For example, the Da Vinci is a minimally invasive robotic surgery system that 
translates a human surgeon’s hand movements into smaller, more precise, movements. See 
generally DA VINCI SURGERY, www.davincisurgery.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2020).
134. For a discussion on the differences between automation and autonomy, see William 
C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding “The Loop”: Regulating the Next Generation of 
War Machines, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1140, 1150 (2013); Chagal-Feferkorn, supra 
note 62, at 70.
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not always be characterized by algorithmic superiority), but also from the 
open-ended normative perspective of the different goals by which each de-
cision-maker is guided.
Part III: Is The Reasonableness Analysis Compatible with Algorithmic 
Tortfeasors?
A. Can the Algorithm Itself Be “Reasonable,” and What Would 
That Mean?
Before delving into the compatibility of reasonableness analyses with 
algorithms and proposing a concrete model for shaping what this analysis 
might look like, there is a basic conceptual issue that must be addressed 
first. Although thinking algorithms do not yet have legal personality,
135
each 
algorithm was programmed by an entity that does. Therefore, we must ask: 
does the exercise of assessing the reasonableness of an algorithm’s behavior 
have any meaning, if performed separately from the reasonableness of its 
manufacturer? This conundrum is divided into two distinct concerns. First, a 
major objection to the development and application of a “reasonable algo-
rithm” standard might be the notion that the reasonableness of an algorithm 
is actually one and the same as the reasonableness of its programmer.
136
Those who hold this objection deem that the reasonableness of the human 
programmer—and not that of the algorithm—is what needs attention.
137
As 
discussed at length in a previous paper,
138
however, there are several factors 
that render the reasonableness of the algorithm non-equivalent to that of its 
programmer. Among them is the dissimilarity in the time between when a 
programmer decides how to program a thinking algorithm and when that 
algorithm later makes a damaging decision (a time lapse that, in the case of 
thinking algorithms in comparison to less sophisticated systems, might have 
135. For a discussion on granting AI systems legal personality see, e.g., Ben Allgrove, 
Legal Personality for Artificial Intellects: Pragmatic Solution or Science Fiction? (June 2004) 
(MPhil dissertation, Oxford Univ.) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=926015). See also European 
Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 with Recommendations to the Commission on
Civil Law Rules on Robotics, EUR. PARL. DOC. P8_TA(2017)0051 (suggesting to grant au-
tonomous robots an independent legal status of “electronic persons”: “[C]reating a specific 
legal status for robots in the long run, so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous ro-
bots could be established as having the status of electronic persons responsible for making 
good any damage they may cause, and possibly applying electronic personality to cases where 
robots make autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties independently.”).
136. Balkin’s “homunculus Fallacy” argument refers precisely to this point. According 
to Balkin, “there is no little person inside the program.” Instead, algorithms act as they are 
programmed to act—no more, no less. See Balkin, supra note 9, at 1234.
137. Spoiler alert: the reasonableness of the programmer of the algorithm, or its manu-
facturer, will indeed be relevant in our model for assessing algorithmic reasonableness.
138. Chagal-Feferkorn, supra note 21.
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extreme significance).
139
Another differentiating factor to consider is that 
reasonableness will be measured based on the programmer’s professional 
field, and not the algorithm’s application itself. For example, if a medical 
application makes a harmful decision, a positive analysis will compare the 
programmer’s actions to how other human programmers might have pro-
grammed a medical application, rather than comparing the algorithm’s deci-
sion against how a human doctor would have acted. This might lead to oc-
casions where an algorithm’s behavior would be deemed reasonable, while 
its programmer’s behavior would not, and vice versa.
140
Second, it is arguable that a determination that an algorithm acted un-
reasonably would be meaningless in terms of tort law policy, as an algo-
rithm itself cannot pay damages from its own pocket—nor can it be finan-
cially deterred from adopting insufficient safety measures in future.
141
A
counterargument is that thinking algorithms do not need to bear the conse-
quences of their unreasonableness themselves for the aims of tort law to be 
met. Rather, a “reasonable algorithm” analysis could be used as a tool for 
determining the liability of the manufacturer of the system or the user of the 
system,
142
such that they be required to pay for damages caused by their al-
gorithm’s unreasonable decision.
143
This would be similar to analyzing the 
behavior of an employee when determining whether their employer is vicar-
iously liable for their actions,
144
or how the behavior of dogs in dog-attack 
cases affects whether their owners are found liable.
145
With respect to deter-
rence, although algorithms themselves would not be affected by a finding 
that they acted unreasonably, this still does not mean that it is impossible to 
deter an algorithm from tortious conduct. A thinking algorithm may be pro-
grammed to consider the potential consequences of a finding of unreasona-
bleness as part of the parameters it weighs before reaching its decision, at 
least to a certain extent—as discussed next.
139. Id. at 136.
140. Id. at 132–139.
141. See, e.g., Colonna, supra note 60, at 102–04.
142. While manufacturers are probably the first to come to mind in the context of algo-
rithmic liability, users’ actions too may be subject of liability. A user can cause damage, for 
example, by intentionally (or unintentionally) feeding the algorithm misleading information. 
Users can also install “patches” of different sources that would alter the choices of the algo-
rithm in a damaging manner. See, e.g., Lothar Determann & Bruce Perens, Open Cars, 32 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 915, 935 (2017).
143. See Lemley & Casey, supra note 27, at 1351–53; Chagal-Feferkorn, supra note 21,
at 139–43.
144. See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Institutional Liability for Employees’ Inten-
tional Torts: Vicarious Liability as a Quasi-Substitute for Punitive Damages, 53 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1 (2019).
145. In general, liability is not imposed if the dog reacted “proportionally” in response to 
a provocative act. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Intentional Provocation, Contributory or 
Comparative Negligence, or Assumption of Risk as Defense to Action for Injury by Dog, 11 
A.L.R. 5TH 127 (2010).
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B. Does the Standard Fit?
i. Yes! Reasonableness is a Flexible Standard for a Dynamic Decision-
Maker
Assuming we can develop a suitable method for assessing the reasona-
bleness of algorithms, a tort framework would indeed be compatible with 
the nature of thinking algorithms. First, it may often be impossible to under-
stand exactly why an algorithm made a certain decision.
146
Given that think-
ing algorithms no longer need to follow a pre-defined recipe but rather are 
capable of creating the recipe on their own, it may be impossible to under-
stand the reason behind the algorithm’s damaging choice.
147
As discussed 
earlier, a reasonableness analysis can be successfully applied in situations 
where it is not known why a tortfeasor acted as it did. Rather, both norma-
tive and positive approaches focus on known parameters, such as reviewing 
the cost of adding precautions versus the expected damage or examining 
whether other similarly situated peers would have achieved the same end 
result.
Second, the reasonableness assessment is indifferent to the type and na-
ture of the tortfeasor whose actions are to be analyzed.
148
At a time where 
experts are endeavoring to find a legal solution for these unique systems that 
do not resemble any other tortfeasor (being non-human, on the one hand, 
but independent and unpredictable, on the other), the good old reasonable-
ness standard may be easily applied. A legal solution specific to algorithms 
is not needed, as the reasonableness assessment can already adjust to differ-
ent types of tortfeasors. In the case of the meningitis patient, if the medical 
record included a handwritten note in Spanish about the patient’s allergy, 
then the normative economic efficiency analysis would be different for a 
human physician who is not fluent in Spanish compared to a medical algo-
rithm. The exorbitant cost of having each physician study all potential lan-
guages that another doctor might use is significantly higher than the proba-
bility that important information will be expressed in an unfamiliar language 
multiplied by the magnitude of damage. But the result would likely be the 
opposite for an algorithm, if teaching languages to algorithms can be done 
quickly and would only require a one-time investment to replicate the skill 
throughout the system. None of these considerations, however, changes the 
essence of the normative assessment itself, which could be applied to think-
146. See supra notes 79–85.
147. By looking at the code, “what we would see is ‘a mysterious alchemy in which 
each individual step might be comprehensible,’ but any ‘explanation’ of why the code does 
what it does requires understanding how it evolved and what ‘experiences’ it had along the 
way.” Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 83, at 189–90 (citing Suresh Venkatasubramanian, 
supra note 76).
148. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
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ing algorithms, despite the many inherent differences between them and 
humans.
In addition to accommodating different types of tortfeasors, including 
ones that are new kids on the block, the adaptability of the proposed reason-
ableness assessment would also be compatible with the dynamic nature of 
thinking algorithms’ abilities. The powers of thinking algorithms grow at a
dazzling speed, due to both the rapid pace of technological advancements as 
well as the self-learning abilities of the algorithms themselves. The 
strengths that algorithms currently possess in the decision-making process 
may only be the tip of the iceberg of future algorithms’ capabilities. But the 
ever-evolving nature of thinking algorithms would only alter the potential 
results, not the normative or positive mechanisms of assessing reasonable-
ness. For example, a driverless car hitting a very small animal because tech-
nological boundaries render it almost impossible to detect objects of such a 
small size while driving will likely be held reasonable under both normative 
and positive analyses.
149
As soon as the driverless car learns how to over-
come the technological challenge, however, the same reasonableness analy-
sis would yield the opposite result. But the exact same mechanism for de-
termining reasonableness will be applied in both situations. In the context of 
rapidly evolving technology, the neutrality of the reasonableness assessment 
has great value. When law is said to chase technological improvements,
150
the neutral reasonableness assessment may be counted on without the ex-
pensive—and often futile—need to constantly reshape the legal framework 
when the technology advances.
151
149. Assuming that developing technology that would allow such detection would be 
very expensive and exceed the cost of expected damage (from a normative perspective) and 
that all other driverless vehicles too are unable to detect small objects (from a positive per-
spective).
150. E.g., Karen Eltis, Breaking Through the “Tower of Babel”: A “Right to be Forgot-
ten” and How Trans-Systemic Thinking Can Help Re-Conceptualize Privacy Harm in the Age 
of Analytics, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 69, 82 (2011) (“It bears repeat-
ing: the law cannot keep chasing after technology; it will inevitably (by its very nature) be 
outpaced, often before the proverbial ink dries.”).
151. Larry Downes, America Can’t Lead the World in Innovation if the FAA Keeps 
Dragging Its Feet on Drone Rules, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2014/10/08/america-cant-lead-the-
world-in-innovation-if-the-faa-keeps-dragging-its-feet-on-drone-rules (identifying how the 
FAA has failed to meet several self-imposed deadlines, as well as Congress’s deadline, to 
promulgate rules relating to personal drone usage). Despite Congress starting to address the 
issue in 2012 (as stated in the Washington Post article), the FAA is still developing its drone 
rules, as evidenced by the Agency not proposing a rule requiring registration until Dec. 26, 
2019. See Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., U.S. Department of Transportation Issues 
Proposed Rule on Remote ID for Drones (Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.faa.gov/news
/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=24534; Tam Herbert, Can the Government Keep Up 
with the Pace of Tech?, TECHNOMY (Nov. 11, 2018), https://techonomy.com/2018/11/can-
government-keep-pace-tech (pointing to U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch being unaware that Face-
book makes money by selling advertising and several internet pioneers claiming that the FCC 
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In addition to the technical compatibility of the reasonableness assess-
ment to thinking algorithms, the assessment is also compatible with striking 
the right balance between the desire to promote safety and the need to avoid 
a chilling effect on technology. As discussed in Part I,
152
a reasonableness 
method for determining liability allows courts to shape social behavior in a 
multi-layered manner that may factor in various and sometimes competing 
interests and goals. Holding that a physician was unreasonable because they 
did not read the medical record despite the facts that the record was short, 
that no other patients were waiting to see the physician, or that the medical 
condition of the meningitis patient was not critical and could have allowed 
the additional time required to read the report would together send a multi-
faceted message as to the various considerations to be taken into account 
when striving to act reasonably. The ability to shape a flexible standard of 
behavior that is capable of factoring in several, potentially contradictory, 
considerations is perhaps of even greater importance in the case of thinking 
algorithms than of humans. As we saw earlier,
153
self-learning systems pro-
vide greater opportunities for mankind, but also greater dangers, than any 
previous technology. The ability to delicately balance the need to apply as 
many safeguards as possible with the desire to encourage the development 
of such systems is therefore of great relevance in our era. Moreover, with 
the rapid changes in self-learning systems’ abilities and the pace at which 
new potential hazards as well as benefits are being discovered, the flexible, 
dynamic reasonableness assessment proposed here will grant the courts 
leeway to adapt both the considerations they take into account as well as the 
weight given to each in order to advance the most optimal policy.
ii. But Flexibility is Also the Greatest Challenge
The great advantage of the reasonableness assessment’s flexibility is al-
so its most significant obstacle in the case of thinking algorithms. To fulfill 
the court’s aim of influencing the choices of potential wrongdoers, the entity 
whose behavior is being influenced must understand, to a certain extent, 
what is expected of them and how to comply with those expectations. When 
expectations are phrased as concrete rules (e.g., do not cross an intersection 
when there is a red light), both humans and algorithms can easily comply. In 
fact, an algorithm will show perfect rates of compliance, for as soon as they 
are programmed to do something, they will not question it.
154
However, 
when the desired behavior is not set as a concrete rule but instead is an 
open-ended standard, algorithms simply lack the common sense that enables 
lacks a fundament understanding of how the internet works as two examples of how out of 
touch Congress is with technological advancement).
152. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 58–72 and accompanying text.
154. Lemley & Casey, supra note 27, at 1370.
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humans to “read” a given situation and understand, without concrete guid-
ance, what is reasonable and what is not:
[P]eople understand that rules and injunctions come with the im-
plied catchall “unless you have sufficient justification for departing 
from the rule” exception. Try telling that to a robot, though. Ma-
chines, unlike at least some humans, lack common sense. They op-
erate according to their instructions—no more, no less. If you mean 
“don’t cross the double yellow line unless you need to swerve out 
of the lane to avoid running over a kid” you need to say that.
155
In other words, clearly defined rules should pose no compliance prob-
lem for algorithms. But the reasonableness assessment often deals with sce-
narios that are not black and white, where several rules and interests may 
contradict one another (“do not run a red light” and “do not hit a pedestrian” 
for example, will conflict when the only way of avoiding a pedestrian is to 
cross a red light). Without specific guidance as to the exact circumstances 
where one rule or one consideration trumps the other, the thinking algorithm 
will likely not be able to use the vague concept of reasonableness to adjust 
its choices accordingly. If an algorithm is armed with sufficient data on 
what was deemed reasonable and what was not by courts, it could theoreti-
cally learn how to act reasonably from experience. Self-learning is, after all, 
the entire notion behind using such algorithms in the first place. But given 
the enormous volume of previous cases required in order for an algorithm to 
self-learn, it seems very unlikely that sufficient data could be accumulated 
to enable thinking algorithms to understand on their own what reasonable-
ness is (a conclusion that would, of course, be individually required in each 
sector, with respect to each type of damage). From a normative perspective, 
the reasonableness analysis may be flexible and dynamic enough to account 
for new types of tortfeasors such as thinking algorithms, but directing the 
behavior of said tortfeasors might prove impossible.
The reasonableness assessment presents a practical challenge from the 
positive perspective as well. Comparison of reasonableness with algorithms’ 
peers is not yet available. Whether a positive comparison would be against 
an average algorithm, against the majority of algorithms, or against a gen-
eral sense of what other algorithms would do, we simply do not yet have a 
compilation of comparable cases that would consistently enable a compara-
tive analysis to the behavior expected from other algorithms. The “reasona-
ble person” and “reasonable professional” standards have become possible 
because there are countless reference points with which to compare the tort-
feasor’s behavior. The reasonableness expected from potential wrongdoers 
would be a standard that is formed, and evolves, over a long period of time, 
allowing for the accumulation of countless relevant comparable cases, such 
155. Id. at 1371.
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that even with respect to the specific circumstances of each damaging act, 
there could be relatively similar occurrences that would offer a relevant 
comparison.
While thousands of companies and startups worldwide are developing 
thinking algorithms,
156
the accumulated knowledge as to what other algo-
rithms would have done in a given situation is limited. First, the develop-
ment and usage of thinking algorithm systems is a relatively new phenome-
non.
157
Second, barriers to entry such as high development costs or heavy 
regulation might lead to cases where very few brands dominate the entire 
market. Third, the technology itself is dynamic, such that certain systems 
may very quickly become obsolete and other systems may be one of a 
kind.
158
Although judges and juries may compensate for the lack of equivalent 
reference points for human tortfeasors by drawing on their own personal 
perspectives or intuitions of what a reasonable person or professional would 
do, judges and juries will likely lack personal understanding of how think-
ing algorithms could or should act in similar circumstances.
159
While one practical solution allowing for a positive analysis of reasona-
bleness would be to compare thinking algorithms to reasonable humans, 
such comparison is not necessarily desirable. As demonstrated previously, 
thinking algorithms oftentimes boast significant advantages over humans in 
their decision-making process. Basing algorithmic reasonableness on that of 
humans would be counterproductive as far as the safety rationale of tort law 
is concerned, as it would not incentivize manufacturers to adhere to an ele-
vated standard of care even if such a standard were available:
156. For details on the number of AI start-ups per country, see Number of Artificial In-
telligence (AI) Startups Worldwide in 2018, by Country, STATISTA (Mar. 2, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/942657/global-ai-startups-by-country.
157. Autonomous vehicles, for example, have been envisioned for many years, but have 
only been put to actual use on a commercial scale in the past decade. See, e.g., Lemann, supra
note 23, at 160.
158. For example, the case of Open AI’s language generator “GPT-3” which is, at least 
for the moment “an entirely new type of technology. . . . There’s no precedent for it. . . .” Ben 
Dickson, The implications of Microsoft’s Exclusive GPT-3 License, TECHTALKS (Sept. 24, 
2020), https://bdtechtalks.com/2020/09/24/microsoft-openai-gpt-3-license.
159. “[O]n the other hand, asking what a ‘reasonable autonomous vehicle’ would have 
done in a similar situation may make the lawsuit far more complicated, at least during the in-
troduction of these vehicles. Jurors can relate with a human driver and understand what a ‘rea-
sonable human driver’ could have done in a similar situation. Jurors may not, without expert 
testimony, be able to determine what a reasonable autonomous vehicle could have done under 
similar circumstances.” Gurney, supra note 21, at 11. “[B]ut an important difference between 
machine learning algorithms and humans is that humans have a built-in advantage when try-
ing to predict and explain human behaviour. Namely, we evolved to understand each other. 
Humans are social creatures whose brains have evolved the capacity to develop theories of 
mind about other human brains. There is no similar natural edge to intuiting how algorithms 
will behave.” Tutt, supra note 23, at 103.
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Indeed, where once “custom”—what most people in the trade or 
profession do and have generally done—was the starting point for 
measuring the appropriate standard of care, US courts today are 
somewhat suspicious of custom-based arguments on the theory that 
these arguments provide too little incentive to modernize and may 
favor entrenched modes of service provision at the expense of the 
victim.
160
The concern of holding algorithms to ill-suited standards will not be 
solved by applying a human-based elevated standard (such as granting safe 
harbors to algorithms that, on average, perform better than humans).
161
First, 
although applying a human-based elevated standard would account for the 
algorithm’s general superiority, such a proposal ignores the continuous im-
provement of thinking algorithms’ abilities resulting both from manufactur-
ers’ technological advancements and from the algorithms’ own self-learning 
abilities. A tort analysis that is satisfied with a constant level of superiority 
of algorithms compared to humans does not incentivize continuous im-
provement.
One may offer to periodically raise the bar required in order to enjoy 
the safe-harbor protection: for instance, allowing a gap of 10% in favor of 
algorithms in the first year, but requiring 20% in the following one. Howev-
er, at least one inherent problem of comparing algorithmic reasonability to 
that of humans would still remain unresolved: the fact that the two types of 
decision-makers are characterized by different strengths as well as weak-
nesses.
162
For several types of causes of damage algorithms may be infinite-
ly preferable to humans (for example, failure to collect relevant information, 
failure to tag it with the right numerical value, and failure to precisely exe-
cute a certain movement). In other instances, however, algorithms’ superior-
ity may be less dramatic. Applying a “one size fits all” gap required be-
tween algorithms’ abilities and those of humans would under-incentivize 
improvement in those areas where algorithms are already performing better 
than the dictated gap: requiring them to be only 10% better than humans, 
when, in practice, they can be 200% better would not create a sufficient in-
centive for improvement. At the same time, such comparison might cause a 
chilling effect with respect to areas where algorithms’ advantage is less sig-
nificant. The same is true with respect to algorithms’ inherent weaknesses—
perhaps even more so. Certain damaging decisions might be driven by algo-
rithms’ intrinsic disadvantages compared to humans, for example when tacit 
knowledge or human compassion is required. Holding algorithms to human 
160. Froomkin et. al., supra note 2, at 51–56.
161. In other words, thinking algorithms (or, more accurately, their manufacturers) will 
be granted immunity from legal liability so long as they can show that on average their error 
rates are lower (or significantly lower) than those of humans making similar decisions.
162. See supra notes 86–110 and accompanying text.
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standards in these cases will indeed incentivize their improvement, but may 
also discourage manufacturers from developing beneficial technologies, de-
pending on various factors (including the feasibility of enhancing the algo-
rithm’s ability and its cost).
Lastly, algorithms’ and humans’ decision-making processes don’t just 
differ with respect to their respective levels of technical abilities. While hu-
mans typically maximize their own personal utility function when making a 
decision, algorithms optimize their decisions based on other types of pro-
grammed functions related to general welfare or profit maximization of their 
manufacturers. Moreover, when attempting to follow the two inherently dif-
ferent functions of utility, humans are affected by stress, emotion, and in-
stinct—all of which algorithms are immune to. While human instinct might 
very well warrant a “reasonable” finding in a case of a human driver hitting 
a pedestrian to save herself, the same outcome may not necessarily be legal-
ly or normatively desired where algorithms are concerned.
163
In that sense, 
comparing the reasonableness of an algorithm to that of humans would not 
be comparing like with like, and might also yield unwarranted or absurd re-
sults.
How, then, might we take the flexible, dynamic assessment of reasona-
bleness that is, from several points of view, very well-suited to thinking al-
gorithms and apply it to them despite the lack of equivalent algorithms 
against which to compare their reasonableness?
Part IV: Proposed Model for Assessing Algorithmic Reasonableness
The discussion so far has shown us some of the primary shortcomings 
of basing an algorithmic standard of reasonableness on the reasonableness 
of humans. The discussion has also revealed that applying a normative anal-
ysis of reasonableness to thinking algorithms will likely do a poor job at ad-
vancing the desired goals, given that the algorithms themselves will find it 
difficult to understand the reasonableness expected of them and act accord-
ingly. To overcome these shortcomings, the proposed model is based on a
blend of human and algorithmic reasonableness.
According to this model, determining whether a thinking algorithm has 
acted reasonably would follow a two-pronged approach. First, a court would 
consider the reasonableness of a human engaging in similar decision-
163. The defense of necessity, for example, may be invoked by a human driver but will 
likely not be applicable to driverless vehicles: “[c]hoices to stay on course or to swerve could 
be justified by invoking the state of necessity. . . . The described scenario is a particular case 
of a state of necessity in which the perpetrator (the manufacturer/programmer) does not direct-
ly face danger to his life but rather intervenes to save one or more persons, causing harm to 
someone else involved in the same dangerous situation. When the perpetrator is not directly in 
danger and does not act out of self-preservation (or kin-preservation), the applicability of the 
general state-of-necessity defence is controversial.” Contissa et al., supra note 130, at 4–5.
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making. For example, the reasonableness of an algorithm administrating 
penicillin to an allergic patient would be compared to that of a human phy-
sician. However, this analysis would ignore the inherent differences be-
tween humans and algorithms, and this prong alone would not allow courts 
to distinguish between cases where the algorithm could have been held to 
higher standard than its human equivalent or where the algorithm is at an 
inherent disadvantage and could not have performed as well as its human
equivalent.
To solve this problem and ensure that the normative considerations ad-
vanced by the courts actually affect potential wrongdoers, the second prong 
of the model will rely on the reasonableness of the programmers (or manu-
facturers).
164
Having decided whether the algorithm itself was reasonable 
based on the reasonableness of a person, the second prong of analysis would 
look at the means undertaken by the manufacturers to minimize damage and 
determine whether these precautions were reasonable. When looking to the 
manufacturer of a medical algorithm that administers medications, for ex-
ample, we would check what safety measures were in place to minimize the 
risk that the algorithm might cause damage to patients with allergies. The 
exact type and scope of what safety measures would be sufficient to meet 
the standard of reasonableness will likely be case-sensitive and in any event 
are a topic for a separate paper.
165
What is important with respect to the pro-
posed model is that the two complementary reasonableness assessments op-
erate on a sliding scale: the less reasonable an algorithm’s behavior is com-
pared to a human, the more we will demand of the manufacturer in order for 
the decision to be deemed reasonable.
164. An important question this paper is not attempting to address, is the manner of allo-
cating liability among various entities related to the manufacturing or designing of the system. 
In the context of cars, for example, the manufacturer of the car itself may be a completely dif-
ferent entity than the one designing the thinking algorithms installed in it, rendering it auton-
omous. A separate entity may install “patches” altering the technology in a manner that might 
lead to damaging decisions. The users of the car and of the road are naturally additional types 
of players to be considered when determining who is liable. See generally, Determann & 
Perens, supra note 142. For the purposes of the paper, however, the entities involved in the 
manufacturing of the thinking algorithms are perceived as one.
165. They could, for example, include some means of constantly monitoring the system 
in order to signal when anything went wrong; of installing “emergency brakes,” allowing 
manufacturers or users to shut down the system in certain circumstances; or of providing on-
going support and patching services. See Omri Rachum-Twaig, Whose Robot Is It Anyway?: 
Liability for Artificial-Intelligence-Based Robots, 2020 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1141 
(2020). Other mechanisms for assuring safety could include developing more than one layer 
of decision-making for each system, such that decisions are independently reached by each 
layer, and those that are found not to be unanimous would then undergo additional scrutiny. 
Cf. Niva Elkin-Koren & Maayan Perel, Separation of Functions for AI: Restraining Speech 
Regulation by Online Platforms, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV 857 (2020) (discussion of the 
multilayer, independent deciders in the context of AI generated content moderation. Alterna-
tively, whether a system was subject to external auditing by a private firm or governmental 
entity or received quality certification could be factors in the analysis).
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A “reasonable algorithm” analysis would therefore include both algo-
rithmic reasonableness (focusing on the specific decision and specific dam-
age caused by the algorithm, as is the case with the “reasonable person” 
analysis) and also manufacturer’s reasonableness (focusing on the safety 
measures implemented by the manufacturer to avoid risk in general).
166
To 
be found reasonable, however, it is not necessary that both assessments re-
sult in a positive answer. Rather, the reasonableness outcome of the first 
prong will determine the level of reasonableness required in the second 
prong for the reasonable algorithm test to result in reasonableness. In other 
words, when the reasonable person analysis applied to the specific decision 
of the algorithm results in algorithmic reasonableness (meaning that a hu-
man would have also caused the same damage), there will consequently be 
more leeway in our reasonableness analysis of the second prong. If on the 
other hand the algorithm caused damage when a human would not have, 
then, to be considered reasonable and escape liability, the manufacturers 
will be held to a much higher standard of reasonableness with respect to the 
safety means they needed to have undertaken. Figure 1 illustrates the rea-
sonable algorithm analysis.
166. Similar to the analysis used in products liability cases concerning design defects. A 
design defect occurs when there is a flaw in the design of a product (and not in its manufactur-
ing), which gives rise to a products liability claim. The majority of states apply a risk utility 
test on design defects, where liability is found when the foreseeable risks associated with the 
product could have been minimized by using a feasible safer alternative. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
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Figure 1: Model for Assessing the Reasonableness of Thinking 
Algorithms
Linking the reasonableness of the algorithm itself, measured against the 
reasonableness of humans, and that of the safety measures implemented by the 
manufacturer serves several purposes. First, it enables a practical positive com-
parison of reasonableness that is based on the reasonable person assessment that 
is familiar to courts. Adding the reasonableness of the means taken by the man-
ufacturers renders the normative approach meaningful as well, as the assess-
ment would then be directed to the party capable of understanding reasonable-
ness and modifying its behavior accordingly. Second, with respect to the sliding 
scale operation of the two prongs, this balance avoids both demanding too little 
and too much of thinking algorithms, fulfilling the underlying aims of tort law 
while avoiding a chilling effect.
Let us return to our first meningitis example, and further assume that, on 
average, a medical algorithm delivers safer results than a human physician. 
What would the two-pronged assessment look like if the algorithm prescribed 
penicillin to the allergic patient, and how does the approach reach a desired bal-
ance between promoting safety and avoiding a dampening effect on technolo-
gy?
In one scenario, the first prong of the reasonableness assessment results in a 
finding of reasonableness—that is, a case in which the algorithm’s decision to 
administer penicillin would have also been reached by a human doctor. Gener-
ally speaking, such scenarios are of less concern with respect to the desire to 
promote safety: not only is the algorithm superior to humans on average, but for 
Would a reasonable person err? 
IIf ves :l 
Apply a relatively lenient standard when assessing 
reasonableness of safety measures taken by manufacturer . 
II f no :1 
If measures are deemed reasonable based on the lenient 
standard : 
Algorithm is reasonable ➔ no liability 
If not : 
Algorithm is unreasonable ➔ liability 
Apply a relatively strict standard when assessing 
reasonableness of safety measures taken by manufacturer . 
li measures are deemed reasonable based on the strict 
standard : 
Algorithm is reasonable ➔ no liability 
If not : 
Algorithm is unreasonable ➔ liability 
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this specific case, technology is no less safe than the human alternative. Be-
cause the minimum safety threshold of the human-level is upheld, society 
would have an interest in further developing the algorithm to be even safer than 
humans.
Under such circumstances, we want to be cautious about exposing manu-
facturers to liability. If the algorithm’s mistake resulted from an inherent weak-
ness that is not currently possible to efficiently improve, we would not want to 
hold the algorithm unreasonable and the manufacturer liable, because the algo-
rithm in such a scenario did not cause damage that a human would not have, 
and has no efficient means of improvement. If, however, the algorithm could 
efficiently be made safer than humans and avoid the mistake a human would 
have made, then we would want to hold the manufacturer liable for not under-
taking the measures necessary to do so. Under such scenarios, the fact that, on 
average, the algorithm is just as safe as a human decision-maker would not suf-
fice. Adding the second prong—the reasonableness of the safety means taken 
by the manufacturer—will assist in distinguishing the former cases from the lat-
ter. If the second prong’s lenient reasonableness analysis shows that the manu-
facturers applied reasonable safety means, this indicates that this is likely not a
scenario where the algorithm could be easily and efficiently made safer. If, 
however, the second prong’s lenient assessment reveals that no adequate safety 
measures were undertaken, this indicates that the algorithm could have effi-
ciently been rendered safer, and thus the initial finding of reasonableness on the 
part of the algorithm itself compared to human tortfeasors would not suffice.
A second and more troubling scenario arises when the positive comparison 
to human reasonableness results in unreasonableness, meaning that the algo-
rithm caused damage that a person would not have. Generally speaking, in such 
cases we would apply greater emphasis on promoting safety because the tech-
nology is not as safe as a human equivalent would be. The same level of safety 
measure taken by the manufacturer that sufficed for a reasonableness finding in 
the former scenario, therefore, would not suffice when the algorithm itself was 
unreasonable. At the same time, given our assumption that algorithmic deci-
sion-makers tend to be safer than human ones, we would still have an interest in 
promoting said technology and be concerned about a potential chilling effect if 
manufacturers are held to standards they cannot meet. If a manufacturer satis-
fies the elevated bar of reasonableness of the safety measures it took, it will not 
be found liable. On the other hand, if the manufacturer cannot show it took all 
available safety precautions (or some other elevated standard of “reasonable-
ness” of the safety measures that a court would apply), we would be less con-
cerned about a chilling effect since the algorithm is less safe than a human and 
there are efficient means of improving it. Liability in this case would be appro-
priate, as it would not put an excessive burden on a manufacturer and would 
promote safety.
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The proposed two-prong analysis of algorithmic reasonableness warrants 
further development and discussion.
167
It does, however, set a practical method 
for applying a “reasonable algorithm” analysis to algorithmic tortfeasors in a 
manner that allows for a fine-tuned balance between the goals of tort law and 
technological advancement.
Conclusion
Algorithms possess unique traits. The flexible, adaptive, and neutral stand-
ard of the reasonableness analysis, be it the positive or the normative one, is 
compatible with these traits. The reasonableness analysis may be applied to var-
ious types of algorithmic tortfeasors, regardless of their specific characteristics 
and abilities, and may be applicable even when the reasons for their actions re-
main unknown.
Unlike humans, algorithms lack the common sense that enables them to 
understand, balance, and follow vague standards rather than concrete rules. Ap-
plying a straight normative reasonableness approach to algorithms would there-
fore be unhelpful. Moreover, applying a straight positive standard to algorithms 
would also be problematic, since there is not currently a sufficient corpus of 
other algorithms with which to compare.
The two-pronged model I propose combines the reasonableness of the algo-
rithm compared to a human with the reasonableness of the safety measures tak-
en by the algorithm manufacturer. By applying both measures, courts and other 
stakeholders could easily assess the reasonableness of the algorithm itself, while 
at the same time reaching the appropriate balance between the competing policy 
desires to promote safety and the need to avoid chilling effects on technological 
development.
167. Addressing questions such as: when safety measures would meet both levels of rea-
sonableness required in the second prong depending on the outcome of the first, whether it 
could be based on the current test for products liability and a design defect, how to apply said 
analysis when there is also fault by the users or by other parties, etc.

